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ELIZABETH G. THORNBURG*

Litigating the Zero Sum Game: The
Effect of Institutional Reform
Litigation on Absent Parties
N the nineteenth century, the lawsuit primarily served as a vehicle for settling disputes between private parties about private
rights.' Each case, therefore, was a "self-contained episode," with
the effects of the judgment confined to parties formally before the
court.2 Further, the court awarded relief to those parties on a "winner-takes all" basis.3
This century, a growing body of legislation4 and constitutional
interpretation5 designed to alter and regulate fundamental social
and economic norms has developed.6 Consequently, a new model
of civil litigation has emerged in which traditional ideas about parties and remedies can be unhelpful at best and may even lead to
unjust results.7
Lawsuits based on this new body of legislative and constitutional
law do not arise solely out of disputes between private parties about
* Director of Legal Research and Writing, Southern Methodist University School of
Law. B.A., College of William & Mary, 1976; J.D., Southern Methodist University,
1979.
1Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1281,
1282 (1976).
2 Id. at 1283 (emphasis omitted).
3 Id. at 1282 (footnote omitted).
4
See, e.g., Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-27 (1982); Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C.
§§ 77a-77aa (1982); Securities Exchange Act of 1934, §§ 78a-78h (1982); Consumer
Product Safety Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2051 (1982); Magnuson-Moss Warranty-Federal Trade
Commission Improvement Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2301 (1982); Voting Rights Act of 1965, 42
U.S.C. § 1973 (1982); Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1982).
5 See, e.g., Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972) (prejudgment seizure); Loving v.
Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (interracial marriage); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S.
479 (1965) (procreation/privacy); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962) (voting rights);
Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (school desegregation); Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948) (racially restrictive covenants).
6 Chayes, supra note 1, at 1288.
7 Id. at 1282.
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private rights. Rather, such suits seek to vindicate constitutional
rights or social policies.' Although each case involves a concrete
dispute between the parties, the implications of the dispute often
reach many people not before the court. As a result, "courts, recognizing the undeniable presence of competing interests, many of
them unrepresented by the litigants, are increasingly faced with the
difficult problem of shaping relief to give due weight to the concerns
of the unrepresented." 9
In attempting to protect the competing interests at issue in modem institutional reform litigation, courts have turned to principles
developed in the courts of equity.' ° When sitting in equity and
granting injunctive relief, courts traditionally take responsibility for
any consequences of their decrees that might adversely affect people
not formally parties to the suit. 1 As the United States Supreme
Court has repeatedly noted:
The essence of equity jurisdiction has been the power of the
Chancellor to do equity and to mould each decree to the necessities of the particular case. Flexibility rather than rigidity has distinguished it. The qualities of mercy and practicality have made
equity the instrument for nice adjustment and reconciliation between the public interest 12and private needs as well as between
competing private claims.
Judicial recognition of the need to balance interests,' 3 however,
does not solve the problem of how to balance them. Several fundamental issues remain unresolved. First, courts have had to determine the goals at which to aim the balancing. Second, they have
had to decide which interests can be balanced and which cannot.
Third, courts have been required to choose the weight to give to the
various affected interests."' This Article will argue that the
8

1d. at 1284.
1d. at 1296 (footnote omitted).
10 For a discussion of the development and doctrines of equity jurisprudence, see
generally W. DE FUNIAK, HANDBOOK OF MODERN EQUITY (2d ed. 1956) and W.
WALSH,A TREATISE ON EQUITY (1930). See also infra text accompanying notes 17-43.
9

I1Chayes, supra note 1, at 1292.
12 Hecht Co. v. Bowles, 321 U.S. 321, 329-30 (1944), cited in Swann v. CharlotteMecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 15 (1971), and Brown v. Board of Educ., 349
U.S. 294, 300 (1955).
13There are alternatives to interest balancing. Indeed, given the problems of overvaluing and undervaluing that have developed under interest balancing, an approach
that seeks to maximize the plaintiffs' recovery might be preferable. For a full discussion
of the implications of interest balancing versus rights maximizing in the context of
school desegregation, see Gewirtz, Remedies and Resistance, 92 YALE L.J. 585 (1983).
14Chayes, supra note 1, at 1312.
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Supreme Court's equitable interest balancing in institutional reform
cases is flawed in certain systematic ways which result in overvaluing nonparty interests. Specifically, the Court has (1) included interests in its balancing that should not be balanced,
(2) overweighted some interests and underweighted others, and
(3) mischaracterized certain interests as public or private in ways
that overstate or understate their importance.
This Article focuses first on the development of doctrines that
allowed the interests of the defendant and the public to modify a
prevailing plaintiff's remedy in equity courts. The Article will then
examine the Supreme Court's application of these equity doctrines15
to the problems of institutional reform litigation in recent cases.
Next, the Article will identify and discuss six factors that affect the
Court's balancing decisions in such cases. Finally, the Article will
evaluate the appropriateness of the weight the Court has given to
the different interests affected by institutional reform litigation
decisions. 16
I
THE ORIGINS OF INTEREST BALANCING

The early English judiciary had a single-level court system.
"Common law" courts dispensed justice by applying rigid rules and
by strictly adhering to precedent that required an absolute judgment for the plaintiff or the defendant.' 7 However, the King reserved the power to intervene in common law court proceedings in
order to see that justice was done in individual cases.' 8 These appeals for individual justice were made directly to the King, but he
15 This Article describes the chronological development of interest balancing in institutional reform cases. This historical approach is necessary because it illustrates the
Court's increasing deference to third-party interests. It also illustrates the success that
third parties have enjoyed in recharacterizing their arguments so that factors once rejected as illegitimate have become interests which courts will balance against the plaintiffs' interest in full relief. A historical approach is also necessary for clarity in the area
of school desegregation because the substantive law changed in the 1970s. A remedies
analysis that ignored this change would be misleading.
16 The Court has also greatly restricted the relief available to plaintiffs by narrowly
defining the plaintiffs' rights, making proof of violations difficult, and carefully limiting
remedies to the scope of provable violations. However, these issues are beyond the focus17of this Article.
See H. McCLINTOCK, HANDBOOK OF THE PRINCIPLES OF EQUITY 3 (2d ed.
1948).
18 Id. (citing Secular Ordinance of Edgar (959-75) ch. 2, Pound & Plucknett, Readings, 194 (allowing persons to seek mitigation of law from the King if the law was too
burdensome)).
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did not become involved in the case personally. Instead, the King
delegated his discretionary power to his chancellors sitting as judges
in equity.' 9 Because these chancellors were generally clergymen
with no formal training in law, they relied on the "law of God" or
on their own consciences, rather than on precedent, when deciding
cases. 20 Consequently, relief in equity varied greatly with the
chancellor.2"
In contrast to the common law courts, equity courts could consider the interests of nonlitigants.2 2 The Chancellor ordered equitable remedies with both the public interest and the rights of the
parties in mind. 23 However, this equitable balancing of party and
nonparty interests did not cause the equity courts to limit a successful plaintiff's remedy whenever it seemed inconvenient or unpopular. Equity courts seldom allowed "public interests" to defeat the
interests of a seriously injured plaintiff.24
Suits to enjoin torts best demonstrate how courts in the United
States apply equity principles to take public interests into account
when deciding cases that could potentially affect such interests.25
19

See id. at 6-10; G. CLARK, EQUITY § 5, at 4-5 (1954).

20See G. CLARK, supra note 19, § 4, at 3-4; H. MCCLINTOCK, supra note 17, at 6

(citing Y.B. 4 Hen. 7, fo. 4, pl. 8 (1489)) (The Chancellor, Cardinal Morton, decided a
case according to the law of God, claiming direct knowledge of it rather than citing
authority); Earl of Oxford's Case (1615) 1 Rep., ch. 1 (Lord Ellesmere cited Deuteronomy ch. 28, v. 30 as authority for the law of God).
21 See G. CLARK, supra note 19, § 15, at 26 (citing Selden's TABLE TALK, TITLE,
EQuiTY, cited in Gee v. Pritchard, 2 Swan. 402, 36 Rev. Rep. 670, 679 (1898)).
Equity is a roguish thing. For law we have a measure, and know what we
trust to, Equity is according to the conscience of Him that is Chancellor; and
as that is larger or narrower, so is Equity. 'Tis all one as if they should make
his foot the standard ....
What an uncertain measure this would be. One
Chancellor has a long foot, another a short foot, a third an indifferent foot.
'Tis the same thing in the Chancellor's conscience.
Id.
22 See, e.g., Recent Cases, 28 HARV. L. REV. 100, 110 (1914) (citing Curran v.
Holyoke Water Power Co., 116 Mass. 90 (1874) ("A court of equity may consider the
convenience and interests of others than the litigants in exercising its discretion whether
to grant its extraordinary relief ..
")). See also G. CLARK, supra note 19, § 5, at 4-5
("The common law can deal only with a two sided case; equity can deal with any
number of sides, settling the rights of all the parties against each other.").
23 See, e.g., Virginian Ry. v. System Fed'n No. 40, 300 U.S. 515, 552 (1937) ("Courts
of equity may, and frequently do, go much farther both to give and withhold relief in
furtherance of the public interest than they are accustomed to go when only private
interests are involved.").
24 See infra text accompanying notes 26-43.
25 Until the middle of the twentieth century, lawyers generally believed that injunctive relief was not available to protect personal (as opposed to property) rights. See
Moscovitz, Civil Liberties and Injunctive Protection, 39 ILL. L. REV. 144 (1944). There-
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In these cases, courts sometimes refuse to issue injunctions because
of the hardship to the public that would result if the requested relief
were granted.
Public hardship is especially important in nuisance cases. Grey ex
rel. Simmons v. Mayor of Paterson26 is illustrative. In that case,
Paterson had built a sewer system that discharged into the Passaic
River. The lower riparian owners sued to enjoin the operation of
the system. The court denied the injunction, basing its decision
largely on the public interest that would be affected if the sewer
system were shut down:
On the one hand, the riparian owner is entitled to redress in respect of the deprivation of his property. On the other hand, the
city of Paterson, at an enormous expense, has put into operation
under legislative authority, and for a long series of years has used
and enjoyed, a system of sewerage which accommodates a population of over 100,000 people. By the restraint prayed for, this
sewerage system will be suddenly destroyed, and the homes of
this multitude of people will be rendered perilous to health and
life, and unfit for occupancy. 27
The court balanced many interests in reaching its decision, including the plaintiffs' property rights, the defendant's investment in the
offending system, the defendant's apparent good faith, the plaintiffs'
delay in bringing suit, and the public health and comfort.28 Since
the plaintiffs' injury was "incidental and comparatively small," 2 9
and because the potential harm to persons not before the court was
great, the court declined to order injunctive relief. Instead, the
court instructed the plaintiffs to seek money damages.3 °
fore, the outlines of equitable interest balancing, including balancing in the public interest, developed in the context of cases concerning property rights.
26 60 N.J. Eq. 385, 45 A. 995 (1900).
27 Id. at 386, 45 A. at 997.
28 Id. at 386, 45 A. at 997-98. The court noted that the sewerage operated under
legislative authority.
29 Id. at 387, 45 A. at 998. Equitable interest balancing already had a firm basis in
American jurisprudence. In Richards's Appeal, 57 Pa. 105 (1868), cited in G. CLARK,
supra note 19, § 215, at 314, the plaintiffs sought to enjoin the defendant from using soft
coal in its puddling furnaces because the smoke discolored the plaintiff's fabrics in his
cotton factory and made his home uncomfortable. The defendants factory was worth
at least half a million dollars and employed nearly a thousand people. 57 Pa. at Il l.
The court, in denying the injunction, specifically relied on the chancellor's discretion in
equity. The injunction should be refused "if it be very certain that a greater injury
would ensue by enjoining than would result from a refusal to enjoin.... [T]he chancellor will consider whether he would not do a greater injury by enjoining than would
result from refusing ..... Id. at 112-14.
30 60 N.J. Eq. at 387, 45 A. at 998.

OREGON LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 66, 19871

The proper balance of interests was also at issue in Madison v.
Ducktown Sulphur, Copper & Iron Co., 3 ' another nuisance case. In
Madison, the court refused to enjoin the operation of a copper plant.
The plaintiff farm owners' property was worth less than $1,000.
The defendant's plant, on the other hand, was worth approximately
$2,000,000.32 Further, the plant was the source of half of the
county tax revenues, employed most of the community's 12,000 residents, and was a major purchaser of supplies from county residents.3 3 An injunction would have forced the defendant to close its
plant, thereby destroying the town's economy.3 4 The court had no
difficulty balancing interests in this case. It denied injunctive relief
and instead awarded damages.3 5
Courts have applied this same interest balancing analysis in nonnuisance cases. In Knoth v. Manhattan Ry.,36 the defendant built
an elevated railway track in front of the plaintiff's premises, thereby
decreasing the value of the plaintiff's property by about $1,200." 7
The plaintiff sued to compel the removal of the track, but the court
refused. The court found the plaintiff's injury small compared with
the injury and inconvenience that the defendant and the public
would suffer if the track were removed.38 Consequently, the court
limited the plaintiff to monetary relief.39
These and other cases illustrate the methods employed by the
courts when balancing the various interests involved in equity
suits." As a general rule, courts have compared both the magni31 113 Tenn. 331, 83 S.W. 658 (1904).
32 Id. at 335, 83 S.W. at 666.
33
Id. at 333, 83 S.W. at 660-61.
34
d. at 335, 83 S.W. at 666-67. The court said it would not "blot out two great
mining and manufacturing enterprises, destroy half of the taxable values of a county,
and drive more than 10,000 people from their homes ....
Id. at 335, 83 S.W. at 666.
35 Id. at 335, 83 S.W. at 667. The court was also influenced by the plaintiffs' ten-year
delay in bringing suit. Id. at 332, 83 S.W. at 662-63.
36 187 N.Y. 243, 79 N.E. 1015 (1907).
37
Id. at 244, 79 N.E. at 1015.
38 The court found that the track was of great public utility and that its removal
would seriously impair train service and increase public danger. Id. at 251, 79 N.E. at
1018.
39 The court also relied on the plaintiff's delay in filing suit and on the comparative
insignificance of his injuries. "A court of equity is not bound to issue an injunction
when it will produce a great public ... mischief, merely for the purpose of protecting a
technical or unsubstantial right." Id. at 252, 79 N.E. at 1018 (citation omitted).
40
See, e.g., Elliott Nursery Co. v. Du Quesne Light Co., 281 Pa. 166, 126 A. 345
(1924); Wilkins v. Diven, 106 Kan. 283, 187 P. 665 (1920); City of Wheeling v. Natural
Gas Co., 74 W. Va. 372, 82 S.E. 345 (1914); Bliss v. Washoe Copper Co., 186 F. 789
(9th Cir. 1911) (refusing to enjoin copper smelter from operating, thereby limiting
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tude of the plaintiff's and defendant's interests and their conduct
with reference to the litigated transaction.4" Courts have also
looked to the nature of the interests affected and to the relative proportion of the interests that each party could lose.42 In addition,
courts have considered various nonparty interests, including public
health, the local economy, the state's interest in developing industries, and public safety.' Courts have refused to grant injunctive relief when these public interests combine with a small injury to the
plaintiff and a large economic hardship to the defendant.4 3
II
INTEREST BALANCING APPLIED TO INSTITUTIONAL
REFORM REMEDIES

A.

Origins

In the second half of this century, Congress and the federal
courts began to recognize or create an increasing number of civil
liberties.' To allow individuals the opportunity to enjoy many of
plaintiff to money damages); Galveston, H. & S. A. Ry. v. De Groff, 102 Tex. 433, 118
S.W. 134 (Tex. 1909) (refusing to enjoin railroad from using tracks in front of hotel for
switching since the hardship to defendant and the public outweighed the inconvenience
to plaintiff); Stein v. Bienville Water Supply Co., 32 F. 876 (S.D. Ala. 1887) (refusing
relief to water company whose exclusive franchise was being unlawfully invaded by
rival company, on the ground that city needed the extra water supply).
The courts consider similar factors in deciding whether to grant specific performance
of contracts. See, e.g., Rockhill Tennis Club v. Volker, 331 Mo. 947, 56oS.W.2d 9
(1932) (interest of public in aesthetic appearance of art museum defeated specific performance of contract for sale of its grounds); Seaboard Air Line Ry. v. Atlanta, B. & C.
R. Co., 35 F.2d 609 (5th Cir. 1929) (refusing specific performance of contract between
two railroads for the protection of a crossing of their tracks because defendant would be
put out of business and made unable to serve the public at all); Conger v. New York,
W.S. & B. R.R., 120 N.Y. 29, 23 N.E. 983 (1890) (refusing to order specific performance of contract to build train station when the agreed on location would create public
danger and inconvenience).
41 Factors such as the defendant's good faith or attempts to correct the problem generally weighed in defendant's favor, while a plaintiff's delay in bringing suit generally
militated against relief. See Madison v. Ducktown Sulphur, Copper & Iron Co., 113
Tenn. 331, 83 S.W. 658 (1904). Cf. Brande v. Grace, 154 Mass. 210, 31 N.E. 633 (1891)
(trial court should have enjoined construction of defendant's addition, but since trial
court erred and the defendant completed its structure, appellate court refused to order
the destruction of valuable property).
42 A court usually ordered a defendant who could abate the nuisance by actions short
of closing its facilities to do so. See, e.g., New Jersey v. City of New York, 283 U.S. 473
(1931) (defendant allowed reasonable time to build incinerators rather than dump garbage into ocean).
43 See cases cited supra note 40.
44 See supra notes 4 & 5.
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these new-found rights, society had to reorder its complex relationships.4 5 When society did not voluntarily reorder those relationships, many people turned to the courts.' Whether the defendant
was a governmental entity, such as a school or legislature, or a private entity, such as an employer or union, the courts were asked to
create equitable remedies that would impact groups in addition to
the defendant and the plaintiff.4 7 Faced with this situation, the
courts relied on the interest balancing principles developed in the
old equity cases. In doing so, the courts adopted the balancing approach from cases in which plaintiffs had small pecuniary interests
to cases in which groups of plaintiffs had important civil liberty
interests.4
The first case addressing this issue was Brown v. Board of Education (Brown II). 49 Although the Court declared in Brown I that
segregated public schools were inherently discriminatory, 50 it postponed ordering an appropriate remedy. Instead, the Court requested reargument on two questions involving relief:
Assuming it is decided that segregation in public schools violates
the Fourteenth Amendment
(a) would a decree necessarily follow providing that, within
the limits set by normal geographic school districting, Negro
children should forthwith be admitted to schools of their choice,
or
(b) may this Court, in the exercise of its equity powers, permit
an effective gradual adjustment to be brought about from existing
segregated systems to a system not based on color distinctions? 5
In answering these questions, the Court announced at the outset
that it was aware of the needs of those other than the black student
plaintiffs seeking an end to segregation. On that basis, the Court
first declined to construct a remedy, remanding Brown IIs companion cases to the district courts for further hearings on the issue of
appropriate remedies 52 and, second, declined to order complete and
45 Chayes, supra note 1, at 1284; Note, JudicialIntervention and Organization Theory: Changing BureaucraticBehavior and Policy, 89 YALE L.J. 513 (1980).
46 See cases cited infra notes 49-194.

47 See cases cited infra notes 49-194.
48 See, e.g., Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971).
49 349 U.S. 294 (1955) (Brown II).
50 Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954) (Brown I).
51 Id. at 495-96 n.13.
52 Brown 11, 349 U.S. at 299. The Court felt that the district courts would be in a
better position to assess whether the schools were complying with constitutional
standards.
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immediate relief 3 In providing guidelines for the determination on
remand, the Court reminded the district court judges that they
would be applying equitable principles and balancing the public and
private interests implicated to resolve the remedies questions. Further, the Court noted that these cases would require the district
courts to grant flexible relief.5 4
The Court specifically set out the interests that the lower courts
were to consider in making their remedy determinations. On one

hand, the black students had an interest in being granted admission
to public schools "as soon as practicable on a nondiscriminatory
basis."" On the other hand, militating in favor of deliberation
rather than speed, were
the physical condition of the school plant, the school transportation system, personnel, revision of school districts and attendance areas into compact units to achieve a system of determining
admission to the public schools on a nonracial basis, and revision
of local laws and regulations
which may be necessary in solving
56
the foregoing problems.
Thus, the Brown II Court gave the administrative difficulties faced
by the local schools considerable weight.
On its face, the Court's Brown II opinion contemplates only a
short preremedy delay to consider local peculiarities and administrative problems. 57 Hostility to the integration remedy was not a
factor the district courts were to consider in the balancing process.
"[I]t should go without saying that the vitality of these constitutional principles cannot be allowed to yield simply because of disagreement with them."5
In actuality, however, the likelihood of white opposition concerned the Court. 9 While it did not mention white opposition and
did not legitimate such opposition as a factor to balance against the
53 1d. at 300. This allowed the lower courts to hear and consider the interests of
other people who claimed to have a stake in the relief ordered.
54 Id. The Court stated that "[i]n fashioning and effectuating the decrees, the courts
will be guided by equitable principles. Traditionally, equity has been characterized by a
practical flexibility in shaping its remedies and by a facility for adjusting and reconciling
public and private needs." Id. (citing Aexander v. Hillman, 296 U.S. 222, 239 (1935)
and Hecht Co. v. Bowles, 321 U.S. 321, 329-30 (1944)).
55 Brown II, 349 U.S. at 300.
56
1d. at 300-01.
57

1d.

581d. at 300.

59 Gewirtz, supra note 13, at 611-12 (citing A. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS
BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS 250-53 (1962); R. KLUGER,
SIMPLE JUSTICE 737-44 (1976); E. WARREN, THE MEMOIRS OF EARL WARREN 288-90
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plaintiffs' rights, 6' the Court evidently recognized hostility as an important factor in remedy formation. 6' In order to protect itself as
an institution, the Court tried to avoid issuing unenforceable orders. 62 The Court also hoped that by signaling flexibility, it could
reduce resistance among the opponents of integration.6 3
The Court cited very little authority for its Brown II balancing
approach, relying instead on unspecified principles of equity. The
principal authority cited was Hecht Co. v. Bowles,' 4 a case that applied equitable principles to the interpretation of the Emergency
Price Control Act of 1942.65 Although often cited for its discussion
of the nature of equity,66 Hecht does not stand as authority either
for delaying remedies to solve administrative problems or for avoiding remedies to curb opposition to them. 67 Nevertheless, since
(1977); and Hutchison, Unanimity and Desegregation: Decisionmakingin the Supreme
Court, 1948-1958, 68 GEO. L.J. 1, 53-54 (1979)).
60 Justice Frankfurter evidently had urged that the Court's opinion mention "attitudes" of opposition in addition to administrative difficulties. Hutchison, supra note 59,
at 52-53.
61 See supra note 59.
62 See R. KLUGER, supra note 59, at 740.
63 See Hutchison, supra note 59, at 53-54.
64 321 U.S. 321, 329-30 (1944).
65 50 U.S.C. §§ 901, 925 (1942) (repealed 1952).
66
Hecht Co.. 321 U.S. at 329-30.
67 The cases cited in the Brown I Supreme Court briefs filed by the opponents of a
full and immediate end to segregated schools justified, at best, delay to accommodate
administrative difficulties. Generally, the cited cases fall into four categories. First,
some contain only general language describing a court's powers to act flexibly while
creating equitable remedies. See Chapman v. Sheridan-Wyoming Coal Co., 338 U.S.
621, 630 (1950); United States v. National Lead Co., 332 U.S. 319, 358 (1947); Yakus v.
United States, 321 U.S. 414, 439 (1944); Alexander v. Hillman, 296 U.S. 222, 239
(1935). A second category of cases deals with questions of justiciability such as abstention and ripeness. See Eccles v. Peoples Bank, 333 U.S. 426, 434 (1948); Meredith v.
Winter Haven, 320 U.S. 228 (1943). A third category of cases uses the flexibility of
equity to provide more rather than less relief to successful plaintiffs. See SEC v. United
States Realty & Improvement Co., 310 U.S. 434, 455 (1940) (court can refuse to sanction reorganization plan of bankrupt corporation even absent statutory authority to do
so); United States v. Morgan, 307 U.S. 183, 194 (1939) (court can order money paid
into registry of the court); Virginian Ry. v. System Fed'n No. 40, 300 U.S. 515 (1937)
(employer can be ordered to negotiate with employees' representative); Northern Sec.
Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197 (1904) (court may enjoin shareholder from buying
any more stock, getting dividends, or exercising control). Finally, a number of the cases
cited to the Court authorize remedial delay based either on the complexity of the case or
the defendant's progress toward a voluntary remedy. See Radio Station WOW, Inc. v.
Johnson, 326 U.S. 120, 132 (1945) (execution of decree stayed until steps taken "with all
deliberate speed" to enable FCC to take license applications); New Jersey v. City of
New York, 284 U.S. 585 (1931) (New York given two years to end dumping, with
semiannual progress reports required on the building of incinerators); New Jersey v.
City of New York, 283 U.S. 473 (1931) (New York City to be given a reasonable time to
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Brown 11, the Court has adopted an equitable balancing approach in
cases involving remedies for civil rights violations.6 8
B.

Later Cases: Absent Party Interests in Institutional
Reform Litigation

People or groups not parties to the litigation often have interests
or expectations that are affected by institutional reform cases. For
example, prison guards are affected by prison reform decrees 69 and
shareholders are affected by remedies in antitrust 7 and securities
law cases. 71 There are two kinds of cases in which the intricacies of
nonparty interests have been most often litigated: school desegregation and employment discrimination cases.
1. School Desegregation Cases
Beginning with Brown 11, the Supreme Court has analyzed institutional reform remedies most fully in school desegregation cases.
Unfortunately, Brown 11's vision of a "prompt and reasonable
start" 72 toward eliminating segregation was not realized. In Cooper
v. Aaron,73 the Court faced the rebellion of the governor and legislature of Arkansas against court-ordered desegregation. Although
the Court emphasized that the state's tactics 74 would not succeed in
"depriving the Negro children of their constitutional rights"75 and
explicitly excluded hostility to racial desegregation as a relevant facbuild incinerators rather than dumping garbage in ocean); Virginia v. West Virginia,
222 U.S. 17, 19-20 (1911) ("[A] State cannot be expected to move with the celerity of a
private business man; it is enough if it proceeds, in the language of the English Chancery, with all deliberate speed."); Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 81
(1911) (in the interest of the public, monopoly's subsidiaries may continue to engage in
interstate commerce while a final decree is worked out); United States v. American
Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 106, 187-88 (1911) (because of the complexity of and public
interest in continued availability at reasonable price, court below given six months to
hear evidence and fashion a decree for permanent relief); Georgia v. Tennessee Copper
Co., 206 U.S. 230, 239 (1907) (defendants given reasonable time to finish building structures designed to stop pollution).
68 See cases cited infra in notes 73-132.
69
See, e.g., Gates v. Collier, 501 F.2d 1291, 1299-1322 (5th Cir. 1974).
70
See, e.g., Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911).
71 See, e.g., Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375 (1970).
72 Board of Educ. v. Brown, 349 U.S. 294, 300 (1955) (Brown II).
73 358 U.S. 1 (1958).
74 Governor Faubus led the legislature to enact laws prohibiting integrated education,
called out the troops to prevent a handful of blacks from attending a Little Rock high
school, made statements "villifying federal laws," and utterly refused to use state law
enforcement agencies to maintain public order. Id. at 15.
75

1d. at 16.
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tor in delaying desegregation,7 6 the Court still gave great weight to
the interests of whites.
Five years later, the Court's patience was wearing a little thin.
Goss v. Board of Education 77 concerned a plan that allowed any
student to transfer when he or she would otherwise be required to
attend a school in which the majority of students were not of the
transferee's race. 7 ' The Court noted that the plan perpetuated segregation. 79 Although the Supreme Court recognized the importance of the "multifarious local difficulties" 8 ° involved in
desegregating schools, it found such considerations inapplicable to
the transfer plan and ruled the plan unconstitutional.8 " The white
students' desire to avoid going to school with black students merited no weight in the Court's balancing of interests.
In Green v. County School Board,82 a frustrated Court mandated
immediate desegregation action. The Court stated that racial discrimination was to be eliminated "root and branch"8 3 and directed
the school board to "come forward with a plan that ... promises

realistically to work now." 4 The Court did not mention the expectations of white students or local administrative difficulties. Such
factors were not significant enough to justify a fourteen-year delay
in desegregation. Ultimately, the Green Court held that it would
accept "freedom-of-choice" plans designed to accommodate the interests of whites and school boards only if those plans also worked
to eliminate segregation.8 5
The Court returned to the issue of available remedies in desegregation cases in Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Educa76

Id. at 7.

77 373 U.S. 683 (1963).
78
d. at 684.
79 Id. at 686-87.
80
d. at 689.
81 Now, however, eight years after [Brown II]. ...the context in which we must
interpret and apply ['all deliberate speed'] to plans for desegregation has been
significantly altered ....The transfer provisions here cannot be deemed to be
reasonably designed to meet legitimate local problems, and therefore do not
meet the requirements of Brown.
Id. One year later, in Griffin v. County School Bd., 377 U.S. 218 (1964), the Court
noted that there had been "entirely too much deliberation and not enough speed" in
enforcing the rights of black students. Id. at 229.
82 391 U.S. 430 (1968).
83
Id. at 438.
8
4 Id. at 439 (emphasis in original).
85 Id. at 437-39.
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tion.86 As it had in Brown II, the Court considered the role of the
court in equity, stating: "[A] school desegregation case does not
differ fundamentally from other cases involving the framing of equitable remedies to repair the denial of a constitutional right. The
task is to correct, by a balancing of the individual and collective
interests, the condition that offends the Constitution.""7 Chief Justice Burger, writing for the Court, listed a number of interests to be
weighed against the interests of the black litigants seeking desegregation. These interests included the students' desire to attend the
schools nearest their homes,"8 time or distance problems involved in
busing,89 the age of the students,9" the location and capacity of
school buildings,9" land values and site availability,92 and the integrity of the educational process. 9 3 Thus, the Swann Court's balancing explicitly recognized minimization of the time a child might
spend on a school bus and the preference for neighborhood schools
as public interests. Nevertheless, the Court considered the interest
in desegregation sufficient to justify an awkward or inconvenient
remedy during the "interim period" necessary to dismantle a dual
school system. 94
Keyes v. School DistrictNo. I,9 5 the Supreme Court's first decision
on school desegregation in the North, was concerned with proof of
violation rather than with the problem of relief. Justice Powell's
separate opinion, however, dealt with the issue of remedies.9 6 Justice Powell would require "that the legitimate community interests
86402 U.S. 1 (1971).
87 Id. at 15-16. Later in the opinion, the Court stated: "The reconciliation of competing values in a desegregation case is, of course, a difficult task with many sensitive facets
but fundamentally no more so than remedial measures courts of equity have traditionally employed." Id. at 31.
88 Id. at 28.
89
Id. at 30-31.
90
Id. at 31.
91 Id. at 20.

Id.
Id. at 30-31. The Court has never explained why the interests of white students are
"public" while the interests of black litigants are "private." See infra Sec. III.B.2. At
times this mischaracterization, which is implicit in the Court's interest balancing from
Swann onward, results in denial of any meaningful remedy to black students. See Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 814 (1974) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
94
Swann, 402 U.S. at 28.
95 413 U.S. 189 (1973).
96
Id. at 217 (Powell, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). Although the subject
of Justice Powell's opinion is the de jure/de facto distinction, many of his comments are
relevant to the question of interest balancing.
92
93

OREGON LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 66, 1987]

in neighborhood school systems be accorded far greater respect." 97
More specifically, he noted that "courts may have overlooked the
fact that the rights and interests of children affected by a desegregation program also are entitled to consideration." 98 Justice Powell
clearly placed greater weight on the interests of families than on the
administrative problems of the school board. He argued that compelling children to leave their neighborhoods impairs liberty and
privacy interests. Further, he voiced a fear that busing would
hasten an exodus from public schools to private schools and from
the inner cities to the suburbs. 99 Justice Powell also warned that
forced integration might diminish support for public schools and
high quality education. He portrayed families as innocent bystanders, characterizing them as "children and parents who did not participate in any constitutional violation."" He would therefore give
their concerns great weight.
In Milliken v. Bradley (Milliken I),"10 the immediate issue was
the propriety of an interdistrict remedy. However, the many opinions in the case shed light on the Justices' views on remedy formation. The five-to-four split in Milliken I reflects a basic
disagreement concerning the result at which the Court's interest
balancing should aim. While the Court unanimously held in
Swann 102 that the "district judge or school authorities should make
every effort to achieve the greatest possible degree of actual desegregation,"' 3 both the majority and the dissent in Milliken I interpreted the purpose of school desegregation remedies quite
differently."0 Dissenting Justices Marshall, Douglas, Brennan, and
White found a duty to "take all practicable steps to ensure that Negro and white children in fact go to school together."10 5 Chief Justice Burger and the majority, on the other hand, interpreted Swann
to mean that the remedy should "restore the victims of discriminatory conduct to the position they would have occupied in the ab-

sence of such conduct." 106
The Milliken I majority found the interest of local school boards
97
98

Id. at 251 (Powell, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
Id. at 247.

99 Id. at 247-50.
0°Id, at 250.
101 418 U.S. 717 (1974).
102402 U.S. 1 (1971).
10 3Id. at 26.
104 See L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 16-20, at 1038 n.5 (1978).
105 Milliken 1, 418 U.S. at 802 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
1
06

Id. at 746.
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all-important. "No single tradition in public education is more
deeply rooted than local control over the operation of schools
... ,,107 As it had in Swann, the Court listed the interests indicating that desegregation should be limited. First, the Court noted the
logistical problems attending the transportation of students. 0' 8 Second, the Court noted that the implementation of an interdistrict
remedy"0 9 would create a host of new problems concerning the
composition and selection of school boards, school financing, taxes,
curriculum determination, the purchasing of supplies, and new
school location and construction. "0
The dissenting Justices balanced the interests quite differently.
Justice Douglas, for example, found that "the equities are stronger
in favor of the children of Detroit who have been deprived of their
constitutional right to equal treatment by the State of Michigan." 11
Justice White stated that the majority had given excessive weight to
the administrative inconvenience interests involved." 2 Additionally, Justice White did not find the Court's "talismanic invocation
of the desirability of local control over education"' 13 convincing.
Community participation, Justice White wrote, was important but
not sufficient to rule out a remedy. He noted, however, that there
were some legitimate public concerns to consider in fashioning a
remedy. Plans that call for "school zoning, pairing, and pupil assignments, become more and more suspect as they require that
schoolchildren spend more and more time in buses going to and
from school and that more and more educational dollars be diverted
to transportation systems.""' 4 Thus, Justice White gave more
weight to the nonparty interests and to the educational process than
to administrative concerns.
Justice Marshall doubted the sincerity of the majority's reliance
107 .1d.at 741.
108 Id. at 743.
109 The remedy contemplated by the lower court would have consolidated 54 independent school districts into one "vast new super school district." Id.
1101d.

III
Id.

at 762 n. 13 (Douglas, J.,dissenting).

112

The core of my disagreement is that deliberate acts of segregation and their
consequences will go unremedied, not because a remedy would be infeasible or
unreasonable in terms of the usual criteria governing school desegregation
cases, but because an effective remedy would cause what the Court considers
to be undue administrative inconvenience to the State.
Id. at 763 (White, J., dissenting).
113Id. at 778.
114Id. at 764.
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on local control. He saw white parents' dislike of busing as the real
motivation for the majority's decision." 5
[J]ust as the inconvenience of some cannot be allowed to stand in
the way of the rights of others, so public opposition, no matter
how strident, cannot be permitted to divert this Court from the
enforcement of the constitutional principles at issue in this case.
Today's holding, I fear, is more a reflection of a perceived public
mood that we have gone far enough in enforcing the Constitution's guarantee of equal
justice than it is the product of neutral
6
principles of law."
The real interest weighing so heavily in the Court's balance, said
Justice Marshall, was not so much local control as hostility to increased integration.
By the time Milliken v. Bradley (Milliken 11) 17 reemerged, the
Court treated the principles governing equitable relief as well-established. First, the nature and scope of the constitutional violation
determines the nature of the remedy. " Second, the court must design its decree to restore victims as close to the position they would
have occupied in the absence of a violation as possible.'
Third,
the court "must take into account the interests of state and local
authorities in managing their own affairs."' 20 The Court also noted
that in order to "ensure that federal-court decrees are characterized
by the flexibility and sensitivity required of equitable decrees, consideration must be given to burdensome effects resulting from a decree that could 'either risk the health of the children or significantly
impinge on the educational process.' "21
115 "[I]t is plain that one of the basic emotional and legal issues underlying these
cases concerns the propriety of transportation of students to achieve desegregation." Id.
at 812 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
1161d. at 814. In Hills v. Gautreaux, 425 U.S. 284 (1976), the Court affirmed its
decision in Milliken L In Hills, black tenants in public housing brought suit against the
Chicago Housing Authority claiming that they were being placed in housing sites in the
city of Chicago instead of in available housing out in the predominantly white suburbs.
A lower court found this to be the case and ordered a metropolitan-area remedy as
opposed to confining the remedy to the city of Chicago. The Court affirmed its decision
in Milliken I, but distinguished it from Hills.
117 433 U.S. 267 (1977).
118 Id. at 280 (citing Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 16
(1971) and Milliken 1, 418 U.S. at 738).
1 9 Milliken I, 433 U.S. at 280 (citing Milliken I, 418 U.S. at 746).
120 Milliken 11, 433 U.S. at 281.
121 Id. at 280 n.15 (quoting Swann, 402 U.S. at 30-31). The Court also noted the
existence of unspecified "practical as well as legal limits to the remedial powers of federal courts in school desegregation cases." Id. at 281 (citing Milliken 1, 418 U.S. 717,
763 (1974)). See also Dayton Bd. of Educ. v. Brinkman, 433 U.S. 406 (1977) (Dayton

I).
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As a practical matter, these three limits on injunctive relief made
desegregation decrees less likely to affect third parties. The close tie
between violation and remedy meant that courts were unlikely to
provide remedies for the secondary effects of segregation such as
segregated housing patterns. The limited goal of restoring victims
to a discrimination-free position also limited the kind of remedies
that courts could provide. With genuinely integrated education no
longer the goal, the odds that a white child would be bused to
achieve a more favorable racial balance were greatly diminished.
The deference courts gave to local autonomy and the resulting prohibition of interdistrict remedies allowed third parties to escape a
court's decree by moving to an adjacent but independent school
district.
The Court's tying of violation to remedy in school desegregation
cases became even more significant as the Court shifted its analysis
on proof of violation. Beginning in the 1970s, the Court held that a
plaintiff seeking to prove an equal protection claim must show purposeful discrimination.12 2 A showing by the plaintiffs that a school
district's policies had a disparate impact on blacks was no longer
sufficient.' 2 3 Therefore, plaintiffs in school cases now have to prove
"not only that segregated schooling exists but also that it was
124
brought about or maintained by intentional state action."'
The scope of the intentional discrimination proved by the plaintiffs can limit the available remedy. In Dayton Board of Education
v. Brinkman (Dayton I),125 the Court directed district judges to
"determine how much incremental segregative effect these violations had on the racial distribution of the ... school population as
presently constituted, when that distribution is compared to what it
would have been in the absence of such constitutional violations." 1 26 A court may provide a system-wide remedy only on
122 See Personnel Adm'r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256 (1979); Arlington Heights
v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S.
229 (1976).
123 See cases cited supra note 122. See also Columbus Bd. of Educ. v. Penick, 443
U.S. 449, 464-65 (1979); Dayton Bd. of Educ. v. Brinkman, 443 U.S. 526 (1979) (Dayton 11).
124 Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189, 198 (1973). The Court did, however,
go on to recognize that school districts that operated a dual school system in 1954 had
an affirmative duty to dismantle that system. Columbus, 443 U.S. at 458; Dayton 11,
443 U.S. at 537. Failure to do so, whether or not coupled with actions having foreseeable and anticipated disparate impact, could provide the necessary proof of intent.
125 433 U.S. 406 (1977).
26
1 Id. at 420.
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proof of purposefully segregative practices with current system27
wide impact. 1
These principles opened the door for opponents of busing to
couch their arguments not as objections to the remedy but as evidence of lack of intent to discriminate. Justice Rehnquist argued
that a school board's preference for neighborhood schools is a neutral factor free of racial motivation. 12' He further found that the
board's allegedly color blind invocation of "legitimate educational
129
objectives" showed lack of segregative intent.
The late 1970s and early 1980s also saw further development of
Justice Powell's deference to nonplaintiff community interests. Expanding on his earlier position, Justice Powell argued that extensive
federal remedial orders would adversely affect the plaintiffs themselves. The courts' "intrusions on local and professional authorities" erode the quality of education, wrote Justice Powell. 13 0 More
important, community opposition to busing can defeat the integrative purpose of the courts' orders when whites leave the system and
reintegration results.'
Thus, Justice Powell continues to give
3 2
great weight to the interests of absent parties. 1
In summary, in the school desegregation cases the Court gives
considerable weight to nonparty expectations.' 3 3 Although the
Court has not afforded these interests sufficient weight to leave
plaintiffs with no remedy at all, they are sufficiently important to
shape the court-ordered relief.' 34 The Court will balance interests
such as student convenience, logistical difficulties, hostility to integration, local control, administrative convenience, and the quality
of education against the black students' interest in an effective remedy. Judicial consideration of these nonparty interests will lead to
decrees that order less busing, provide for the busing of black rather
127 Id. (citing Keyes, 413 U.S. at 213).
128 See Columbus, 443 U.S. at 503 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
12 9 Id. at 510.
130 Id. at 483 (Powell, J., dissenting).
131 Id. at 484.
132 See Estes v. Metropolitan Branches of Dallas NAACP, 444 U.S. 437 (1980) (Powell, J., dissenting from dismissal of writs as improvidently granted) (giving great weight
to busing of very young children, time and distance of busing, "economic, social, and
educational factors," migration to suburbs, community support, and city tax base).
133 The interests of white families opposed to busing are not always unrepresented.
Rather, this perspective is often shared by the defendant school board. See Yeazell,
Intervention and the Idea of Litigation: A Commentary on the Los Angeles School Case,
25 UCLA L. REV. 244, 249 (1977).
134 See Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971). These interests have sometimes supported legislative limits on court-ordered remedies.
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than white children, and provide for enriched learning centers in
minority neighborhood schools.' 3 5
2.

Employment Discrimination

The second major group of institutional reform cases involving
the needs of absent parties arose in the context of employment discrimination. Plaintiffs bring employment discrimination claims
either as constitutional equal protection claims (when the employer
is a government body), claim under Title VI! of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964,136 or both. The courts' analyses of remedies vary depending both on the constitutional or statutory basis of the plaintiff's claim and, if the claim is statutory, on the specific
portions of
37
Title VII relevant to the issue before the court.'
Courts tend to balance interests in constitutional cases in much
the same way that they do in school desegregation cases. In Title
VII cases, however, courts begin with an analysis of the relevant
statutory language and legislative history before moving to general
equitable balancing. In formulating Title VII remedies, courts are
guided by two principles. 3 ' The first is statutory. The remedial
purpose of Title VII is "to make persons whole for injuries suffered
on account of unlawful employment discrimination."'' 3 9 The second is equitable. "[W]hen Congress invokes the Chancellor's conscience to further transcendent legislative purposes, what is
required is the principled application of standards consistent with
those purposes and not 'equity [which] varies like the Chancellor's
foot.' ,,14

Courts consider the expectations of nonparties important when
formulating remedies for employment discrimination. Courts also
balance the nature of the relief requested and the number of nonpar135 See, e.g., Tasby v. Wright, 585 F. Supp. 453 (N.D. Tex. 1984), aff'd sub nom.
Tasby v. Black Coalition to Maximize Educ., 771 F.2d 849 (5th Cir. 1985) (approving
enriched learning centers in South Dallas as an alternative to busing).
136 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to e-17 (1982).
137 See infra text accompanying notes 199-217.
138 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1982) sets forth the relief a court is empowered to grant.
A court may do the following:
order such affirmative action as may be appropriate, which may include, but is
not limited to, reinstatement or hiring of employees, with or without back pay
(payable by the employer, employment agency, or labor organization, as the
case may be, responsible for the unlawful employment practice), or any other
equitable relief as the court deems appropriate.

Id.
139 Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 418 (1975).
140 Id. at 417. See also supra note 21.
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ties affected by the remedy in making their remedy decisions. However, the Justices differ sharply as to the correct analysis to apply
and the appropriate weight to give to the interest of absent parties.
4 ' the
In Los Angeles Departmentof Water & Power v. Manhart,"
issue was whether women, because they have a longer life expectancy than men, could be forced to pay more into an employer's
pension fund.' 4 2 The Court recognized that unless women as a
class were assessed an extra charge, their pensions would be subsidized by male employees. Los Angeles maintained that fairness to
male employees justified an extra assessment against female employees.14 3 The Court, however, gave this argument little weight in considering whether the employer's system violated Title VII.
[T]he question of fairness to various classes affected by the statute is essentially a matter of policy for the legislature to address.
Congress has decided that classifications based on sex, like those
based on national origin or race, are unlawful. ... But a statute

that was designed to make [sex] irrelevant in the employment
market ...

could not reasonably be construed to permit a take-

home-pay differential based on a [sexual] classification.'"
The Court gave nonparty expectations much greater weight in
considering whether to award retroactive relief to the female employees. Here, the Court considered the interests of both male employees and retired employees in finding the lower court's award of
retroactive reimbursement in error.
Retroactive liability could be devastating for a pension fund.
The harm would fall in large part on innocent third parties....
If the reserve proves inadequate, either the expectations of all
retired employees will be disappointed or current employees will
be forced to pay not only for their own future security but also
for the unanticipated
reduction in the contributions of past
45
employees. 1

Five years later, in striking down a state retirement plan paying
women lower benefits than men due to women's longer life expectancy, the Court still deferred to the interests of the defendants and
third parties in awarding a remedy.' 4 6 In Arizona Governing Com141
14 2

435 U.S. 702 (1978).
Id. at 704.

143 Id. at

708.

Id. at 709. The Court also stated that "[e]ven if the statutory language were less
clear, the basic policy of the statute requires that we focus on fairness to individuals
rather than fairness to classes." Id.
145 Id. at 722-23 (footnote omitted).
146 Arizona Governing Comm. v. Norris, 463 U.S. 1073 (1983).
144
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mittee v. Norris,147 a majority of the Court held that Title VII forbids employers to pay lower retirement benefits to women based on
sex-based actuarial tables. 4 ' On the remedy issue, however, five
Justices refused to apply their holding retroactively. Those Justices
voting to deny retroactivity 4 9 were concerned about the remedy's
effect on insurance companies and the insured's benefits,' 5 0 as well
as the financial effect such a ruling would have on state and local
governments.' 5
In these pension cases, the Court balanced interests in deciding
whether to award monetary relief. Remedy decisions are even more
difficult when the Court considers injunctive remedies such as hiring and promotion goals or protection against layoffs. The Court's
balancing in such cases sometimes involves a truly "zero sum"9
game: 5 2 any benefit given to one group will take something away
from another.
The Court first faced questions regarding injunctive relief in the
context of identified victims of discrimination. In Franks v. Bowman TransportationCo. ,'3 the Court approved competitive seniority awards to discrimination victims.'" 4 While recognizing that
interest balancing was appropriate, the Franks Court distinguished
the equitable principles applicable in institutional reform cases from
those utilized in more traditional forms of litigation. The majority
thought competitive seniority was consistent with the "traditional
view that '[a]ttainment of a great national policy . . .must not be
confined within narrow canons for equitable relief deemed suitable
by chancellors in ordinary private controversies.' "1
The majority
147 ,[d.
148d.

149 Justices Powell, Burger, Blackmun, Rehnquist, and O'Connor voted against a retroactive award.
150Norris, 463 U.S. at 1106.
151

Id. at 1106-07.
152 See Firefighters v. Stotts, 467 U.S. 561, 621 (1984) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
1 424 U.S. 747 (1976).
154 Plaintiffs brought a class action against their employer claiming that the employer
engaged in racially discriminatory employment practices. The Court held that such
discriminatory practices occurred and allowed both named and unnamed class members
seniority status as if they had started work when the discriminatory practice occurred.
Id. at 750-51, 779.
Plaintiffs had sought "competitive seniority" as well as "benefit-type seniority." Benefit-type seniority is generally used in the accumulation of fringe benefits, i.e., pension
amounts or vacation time allotted. Competitive seniority refers to job related "rights"
such as who will be laid off first, brought back first, or promoted. See id.at 782 n.1
(Powell, J.,
concurring in part, dissenting in part).
55Id. at 778 (quoting Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 177, 188 (1941)).
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acknowledged the expectations of white employees, but did not allow those expectations to limit the relief awarded the black
plaintiffs.
[I]t is apparent that denial of seniority relief to identifiable victims of racial discrimination on the sole ground that such relief
diminishes the expectations of other, arguably innocent, employees would if applied generally frustrate the central 'make whole'
objective of Title VII. These conflicting interests of other employees will, of course, always be present in instances where some
scarce employment benefit is distributed among employees on the
basis of their status in the seniority hierarchy. .

.

. [W]e find

untenable the conclusion that this form of relief may be denied
merely because the interests of other employees may thereby be
affected. 156
Justice Powell, joined by Justice Rehnquist, would have given
considerably greater weight to the expectations of white employees.
Justice Powell suggested that competitive seniority should be available only after the district court balances the claims of innocent
incumbents against the plaintiffs' need to be made whole. He would
allow no presumption in favor of competitive seniority. 57
The Court came closer to Justice Powell's position when it faced
the issue of Title VII remedies in International Brotherhood of
Teamsters v. United States.'5 8 Speaking of the "delicate task of adjusting the remedial interests of discriminatees and the legitimate
expectations of other employees innocent of any wrongdoing,"' 5 9
the Court once again invoked the principles of equity and cited
Hecht Co. v. Bowles."6 In Teamsters, the Court's balancing gave
more weight to the expectations of incumbent employees than those
expectations had been given in Franks. 6 ' The Court listed factors
such as "the number of victims, the number of nonvictim employees
56

Id. at 774-75. See also Vogler v. McCarty, Inc., 451 F.2d 1236, 1238-39 (5th Cir.
1971) (cited with approval in Franks, 424 U.S. at 775 n.35); United States v. Bethlehem
Steel Corp., 446 F.2d 652, 663 (2d Cir. 1971) (cited with approval in Franks, 424 U.S. at
775).
157 Franks, 424 U.S. at 785-86. Justice Powell also suggested that the court could
consider factors such as the employee turnover rate and the number of class members
seeking relief in fashioning a remedy. Id. at 799 n.20.
158 431 U.S. 324 (1977).
159 Id. at 372.
160Id. at 374-75. See Hecht Co. v. Bowles, 321 U.S. 321, 329-30 (1944); supra notes
64-67 and accompanying text.
161 Courts are to " 'look to the practical realities and necessities inescapably involved
in reconciling competing interests,' in order to determine the 'special blend of what is
necessary, what is fair, and what is workable.' " Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 375 (quoting
Lemon v. Kutzman, 411 U.S. 192, 200-01 (1973) (Burger, C.J.)).
1
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affected and the alternatives available to them, and the economic
circumstances of the industry" as relevant equitable considerations
62
to guide the lower court in striking a proper balance of interests .
Another group of remedy cases in the employment context involved class-based relief. These cases indicate that a tenuous consensus has emerged on some bottom line results, although the
individual Justices remain greatly divided on how to reach those
results. An examination of the shifting majorities and pluralities in
the cases is mhereuore necessary.
In United Steelworkers v. Weber,t63 the Court considered a hiring
plan voluntarily adopted by the employer and union. The plan reserved half of the openings in an in-plant training program for minorities. A white employee who was denied admission to the
program challenged it as violative of Title VII. A majority of the
Court disagreed. Justice Brennan, writing for the majority, found
the plan permissible because it was designed to break down old patterns of discrimination and was structured to open employment to
blacks in occupations traditionally closed to them. Justice Brennan
also noted that the plan did not "unnecessarily trammel the interests of the white employees.'
Fullilove v. Klutznick 161 involved an affirmative action program
enacted by Congress which required that ten percent of the federal
funds provided for local public works projects be set aside for minority businesses. Six Justices upheld the program against an equal
protection clause challenge by white contractors.' 6 6 Justice Burger,
writing for himself and Justices White and Powell, noted that the
program would adversely affect nonminority firms. That the setaside might "disappoint the expectations" of whites, however, was
162 Id. at 376 n.62 (citing Justice Powell's separate opinion in Franks rather than the
majority opinion. Franks, 424 U.S. at 796 n. 17 (Powell, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part)).
163 443 U.S. 193 (1979).
164 Id. at 208. Justice Brennan observed that the plan did not require the discharge of
whites and did not absolutely bar the advancement of whites. The temporary nature of
the plan also made it more acceptable to the majority.
Justices Burger and Rehnquist, writing in dissent, would have held that Title VII bars
all race-based preferences. Id. at 219.
165 448 U.S. 448 (1980).
166 Justice Stewart, joined by Justice Rehnquist, dissented, stating that the equal protection clause prohibits all racial classifications. Id. at 531-32. Justice Stewart distinguished pupil assignment plans in school cases, noting that "no pupil was deprived of a
public school education as a result." Id. at 527 n.6. Justice Stevens also dissented,
finding that the relationship between the set-aside and the past discrimination was not
close enough. Id. at 540-41.
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held insufficient to render the program unconstitutional.1 67 Justice
Burger pointed out that, as in Weber, the burden shouldered by
nonminorities was relatively light.1 68 Further, he suggested that the
burden was not inequitable.
[A]lthough we may assume that the complaining parties are innocent of any discriminatory conduct, it was within congressional power to act on the assumption that in the past some
nonminority businesses may have reaped competitive benefit over
the years from the virtual exclusion
of minority firms from these
69
contracting opportunities. 1
In a separate concurrence, Justice Powell emphasized that the setaside had a limited effect on whites. "Any marginal unfairness to
innocent nonminority contractors is not sufficiently significant-or
sufficiently identifiable-to70 outweigh the governmental interest
served by [the program]."
The Court recently considered four programs that provide race
based preferences in hiring or promotion decisions. In Local 28,
Sheet Metal Workers' InternationalAssociation v. EEOC, 7 ' a majority of Justices upheld a numerical goal for minority union membership. In Local 93, InternationalAssociation of Firefightersv. City
of Cleveland, 72 the Court upheld a consent decree embodying a
race conscious promotion plan. In United States v. Paradise,73 the
Court approved a remedial order requiring that fifty percent of promotions go to blacks until the employer implemented a nondiscriminatory promotion plan. In Johnson v. Transportation Agency,
Santa Clara County, 17 the Court upheld the promotion of a female
employee, pursuant to an affirmative action plan, and consequent
nonpromotion of a marginally better qualified male employee.
These decisions indicate that a majority of the Court approves of
the use of race conscious relief as a remedy for past discrimination
under certain circumstances, even when that relief benefits persons
75
not proved to be victims of the past discrimination.
67

Id. at 484.
Id,
169 Id. at 484-85. Justices Marshall, Brennan, and Blackmun also voted to uphold
the plan, testing it under the intermediate level of scrutiny set out by Justice Marshall in
Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 359 (1978) (opinion of Justices Brennan, White, Marshall and Blackmun).
17 0
Fulliloye, 448 U.S. at 515.
171 106 S. Ct. 3019 (1986).
172 106 S. Ct. 3063 (1986).
173 107 S. Ct. 1053 (1987).
174 107 S. Ct. 1442 (1987).
175 See infra text accompanying notes 176-82.
1
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All of the Justices, however, would give some deference to the
interests of white employees in cases such as these. Justices Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens would consider the effect of
the remedy on white employees as part of traditional equitable interest balancing. In deciding whether a race-based preference is
proper, one factor they consider is the effect of the hiring or promotion preference on the interests of white employees. 7 6 Justice Powell reasons similarly. In evaluating a remedy, he would look to the
effect of the. bu!rden on white employee-s and to the "diffuseness" of
the burden. 7 7 Justice O'Connor would give slightly more weight to
the nonminorities' interests. She noted in her opinion in Sheet
Metal Workers that race-based remedies are least likely to be acceptable when their effect will be "concentrated upon a relatively
7
small, ascertainable group of nonminority persons."' 1
Other Justices give nonminority interests even greater weight.
Justice White has approved hiring preferences' 79 but finds that the
interests of nonminorities outweigh the interests of minorities in a
class-based remedy whenever that remedy would cause a current
employee to lose his or her job.'8 0 Justice Rehnquist would not allow any race-based preferences for persons other than the identified
victims of a particular employer's discrimination.' 8 ' Thus, he
would hold that the expectations of nonminorities outweigh the
plaintiffs' interest in a group remedy. Although Justice Burger, in
deference to the powers of Congress, upheld the minority set-aside
in Fullilove, he too would prohibit race based discriminatory reme82
dies under Title VII. 1

176 Local 28, Sheet Metal Workers' Int'l Ass'n v. EEOC, 106 S. Ct. 3019, 3052
(1986); Johnson, 107 S. Ct. at 1451; Paradise, 107 S.Ct. at 1073.
177Sheet Metal Workers, 106 S.Ct. at 3057 n.3 (Powell, J., concurring); Paradise, 107
S. Ct. at 1075-76 (Powell, J., concurring).
178 Sheet Metal Workers, 106 S. Ct. at 3061 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (quoting
EEOC v. Local 638 . . . Local 28 of the Sheet Metal Workers' Int'l Ass'n, 753 F.2d
1172, 1186 (1986)).
179E.g., Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448 (1980); United Steelworkers v. Weber,
443 U.S. 193 (1979).
180
See Sheet Metal Workers, 106 S. Ct. at 3062-63 (White, J., dissenting); see also
Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 294-95 (1986) (White, J., concurring);
Firefighters Local Union No. 1784 v. Stotts, 467 U.S. 561 (1984).
I Local No. 93, Int'l Ass'n of Firefighters v. City of Cleveland, 106 S. Ct. 3063,
3083 (1986) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); Sheet Metal Workers, 106 S.Ct. at 3063 (Rehnquist, J.,dissenting); Weber, 443 U.S. 219-55 (Rehnquist, J.,dissenting).
182 Weber, 443 U.S. at 216-19 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). Justice Scalia has also indicated that he disapproves of any race-based preference. See Scalia, The Disease as Cure,
1979 WASH. U.L.Q. 147. See also Johnson v. Transportation Agency, Santa Clara
County, 107 S. Ct. 1442, 1465-76 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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In cases involving competitive seniority and layoffs, nonminority
employees have fared better than they have in hiring cases.
Although this disparate treatment is based on questionable constitutional analysis," 3 the Court has nevertheless weighed the interests
of employees in layoff cases more heavily than it has weighed the
interests of applicants in hiring cases."8 4
The Court has yet to approve a remedy that allows laying off
senior white employees in order to protect newly hired blacks. In
Firefightersv. Stotts,t" 5 the district court enjoined the City of Memphis from applying its "last hired, first fired" seniority policy insofar
as it would decrease the percentage of black employees in certain
job classifications. 1 6 When Memphis decided to lay off some employees, the court's order forced the city to lay off some nonminority employees with more seniority than the retained minority
employees. 18 7 Five members of the Supreme Court found this remedy improper, in part because of its effect on nonminority employees.' 8 As Justice O'Connor, concurring in the decision, stated
explicitly: "A district court may award preferential treatment only
after carefully balancing the competing interests of discriminatees,
innocent employees, and the employer." 189
The Court returned to the question of layoff protection in Wygant
v. Jackson Board of Education,'9° an equal protection challenge to a
provision in a collective bargaining agreement extending preferen183 Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 319 n.14 (1986) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
184 Admittedly, this is not the only area in which employees have received greater
protection than applicants or probationary employees. See, e.g., Board of Regents v.
Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972) (procedural due process rights). Employees generally have
procedural due process rights, however, only when they have a property interest in their
job. The interests of nonminority employees are protected even when they have no
enforceable right to their jobs under state law.
185 467 U.S. 561 (1984).
86
1 Id. at 567.
187 In so ruling, the district court was modifying an earlier consent decree. The consent decree provided promotion and back pay to various employees and adopted a longterm goal of increasing minority representation in each job classification in the fire department. The status of the court's order as a modification of the consent decree
clouded the procedural posture of the case, and led to considerable discussion of what
kinds of violations were or could have been proven if the case had been fully litigated.
Id. at 565-68.
188 Id. at 579. The language in Stotts indicating that only identified victims may receive seniority relief was disapproved as dictum in Local 28, Sheet Metal Workers Int'l
Ass'n v. EEOC, 106 S. Ct. 3019, 3049 (1986).
189 Stotts, 467 U.S. at 588 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
190 476 U.S. 267 (1986).
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tial protection against layoffs to some minority employees. As in
Stotts, five Justices found the racial preference unacceptable. Justice Powell, writing for himself and Justices Burger and Rehnquist,
distinguished Wygant from the earlier hiring cases. Hiring goals,
wrote Justice Powell, "may burden some innocent individuals, [but]
they simply do not impose the same kind of injury that layoffs impose. Denial of a future employment opportunity is not as intrusive
as loss of an existing job." 19 ' As she had in Stotts, Justice O'Connor
CirraA1.
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need to balance interests, stating that affirmative action plans must
refrain from imposing "disproportionate harm on the interests...
of innocent individuals directly and adversely affected by a plan's
racial preference."' 92 Thus, because of the impermissible effect on
white employees, the Court deemed the layoff plan in Wygant an
unacceptable means of curing past discrimination. Justices Marshall, Brennan, and Blackmun, on the other hand, would have upheld the plan.193 Justice Marshall noted that the plan was a
compromise which carefully balanced the equities involved and
which had been developed through a process involving representatives of all affected groups. 194
As the above discussion illustrates, the employment cases as a
group give varying deference to absent-party interests.1 9 5 When individual minority plaintiffs prove injury, the interests of white employees generally will not prevent courts from awarding hiring,
191 Id.

at 282-83.

92

Id. at 287 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Justice O'Connor further notes that it is
unnecessary for the Court to resolve the "troubling question [ ] of whether any layoff
provision could survive strict scrutiny .... " Id. at 293 (emphasis added).
In a later case, Justice Powell enunciated the test that he would apply to answer the
constitutional question:
1

Of course, it is too simplistic to conclude from the combined holdings in Wygant and this case that hiring goals withstand constitutional muster whereas
layoff goals and fixed quotas do not. There may be cases, for example, where a
hiring goal in a particularly specialized area of employment would have the
same pernicious effect as the layoff goal in Wygant. The proper constitutional
inquiry focuses on the effect, if any, and the diffuseness of the burden imposed
on innocent nonminorities, not on the label applied to the particular employment plan at issue.
Sheet Metal Workers, 106 S. Ct. at 3057 n.3 (Powell, J., concurring).
193 See Wygant, 476 U.S. at 295 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
94

1

Id. at 299.

195 Technically, white employees may not be "absent" from these lawsuits at all.
Sometimes, as in Weber, Fullilove, and Wygant, they are the plaintiffs. The court's primary inquiry, however, is the proper remedies to award minorities to correct the
problems of past discrimination.
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backpay, promotion, or competitive seniority remedies. 96 Courts
may also grant class-based relief for persons who are not individual
victims, 97 but courts will weigh the interests of white employees
more heavily in these cases.19 8 As the group of nonminority employees adversely affected by the remedy gets smaller and the remedy gets more job threatening, courts give the nonminority interests
increased weight. The Court, however, apparently does not consider the employer's ability to change the remedy's effect on nonminorities by using alternatives to layoff or by promoting or training
more employees.
III
EQUITABLE INTEREST BALANCING ANALYZED:
PATTERNS AND PRACTICES

A.

What Tips the Scales?

At least six considerations enter into the Supreme Court's equitable remedies calculus. First, the Court applies a different standard
in cases based on constitutional rights than in cases based on legislative enactments. To some degree, the Court's analysis also varies
according to the specificity of the remedial provisions set forth in
the statutes. Second, the Court weighs the interests of local governments-interests of both convenience and federalism-more heavily
than the interests of absent individuals. Therefore, to the extent
that third parties identify their interests with those of a governmental body., they are more likely to have their interests considered.
Third, the Court gives some attention to the possible disruptive resuits that may be caused by the contemplated relief. A fourth and
related factor is the absent party's ability to thwart the remedy
through resistance or avoidance. A fifth consideration is the source
of the suggested remedy: Did it come from the defendant institution, the agreement of the parties, or was it imposed by a lower
196 Members of the Court differ regarding an employer's ability to voluntarily provide race-based remedies for its own prior discrimination. While the Court does not
require an actual finding of prior discrimination, some evidence is needed. Justices Powell, Burger, and Rehnquist would require "convincing evidence." Wygant, 476 U.S. at
277. Justice O'Connor would require "information which gives [the employer] a sufficient basis for concluding that remedial action is necessary ....
Id. at 291. See also
Johnson v. Transportation Agency, Santa Clara County, 107 S. Ct. 1442, 1461 (1987).
Justice Blackmun would approve voluntary affirmative action when there had been an
"arguable violation" of Title VII. United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 211
(1979).
97
1 See supra text accompanying notes 171-94.
198 See supra text accompanying notes 153-62.
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court? Sixth, the Court considers whether a group is available to
administer the remedy.
1.

The Basis of the Cause of Action

In cases based on federal statutes, 99 the interests and expectations of absent parties are apt to receive less weight than they do in
cases directly based on the Constitution, except insofar as the statute specifically gives those interests some weight. 2 ° The balancing
is foreordained by Congress.
For cases brought under an Act of Congress rather than the Constitution, the problem, formally at least, is not difficult. The
courts can be said to be engaged in carrying out the legislative
will, and the legitimacy of judicial action can be understood to
rest on a delegation from the people's representatives. The judiciary is also, at least in theory, accountable: If Congress is dissatisfied with the execution of its charge, it can act to modify or
withdraw the delegation. 2 ° '
The cases surveyed above illustrate the differences in weight the
Court gives to absent party interests in constitutional versus legislative cases. In desegregation litigation brought under the fourteenth
amendment, the Court has consistently given third-party expectations considerable weight.20 2 The Court limited the importance of
absentee interests only when plans such as voluntary transfer 20 3 and
"freedom-of-choice '2° were revealed to be the equivalent of no
remedy at all for black schoolchildren. Third-party interests, such
as local control over schools, neighborhood attendance patterns,
and time spent on buses, have had significant impacts on the remedies allowed successful plaintiffs in school desegregation cases.20 5
199 These cases can be brought under provisions such as 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983, or
2000e-5 (1982) (prevention of unlawful employment practices).
200 See, e.g., Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 706(g), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1982).
201 Chayes, supra note 1, at 1314.
202 See, e.g., Brown v. Board of Educ., 349 U.S. 294 (1955) (Brown II).
203 Goss v. Board of Educ., 373 U.S. 683 (1963). Under voluntary transfer,
a student, upon request, would be permitted, solely on the basis of his own
race and the racial composition of the school to which he has been assigned by
virtue of rezoning, to transfer from such school, where he would be in the
racial minority, back to his former segregated school where his race would be
in the majority.
Id. at 684.
204 Green v. County School Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 439-42 (1968).
205 See, e.g., Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267, 281 (1977) (Milliken II) (the courts
must consider "the interests of state and local authorities in managing their own affairs"); Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 30-31 (1971) (consideration of students' time of travel).
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These interests have also resulted in the increasing use of remedies
such as "super schools" with enriched educational opportunities,
which affect nonparties only insofar as paying for them may increase local taxes.2 °6
In employment discrimination cases brought under Title VII, on
the other hand, the interests of absentee white employees have had
less influence on the remedy. When plaintiffs as a class have proved
actual discrimination against themselves as individuals, courts have
allowed the interests of nonminority employees to affect the remedy
only in unusual cases. 20 7 Even in cases of group remedies that benefit persons who were not proven victims of a particular employer's
discrimination, the interests of nonminorities have not always been
controlling. When the remedy has affected a large group of nonminority third parties by foreclosing one of numerous job opportunities, their interests have been insufficient to prevent the court from
granting a remedy. 2 8 This is true even though remedies such as
hiring goals and minority set-asides will adversely affect specific
white applicants. Absentee interests have worked to eliminate a
remedy creating a race-based preference only when the remedy
would have eliminated most work opportunities for a small and
identifiable group. 2°
206 See, e.g., Tasby v. Wright, 630 F. Supp. 597 (N.D. Tex. 1986) (West Dallas learning centers); Tasby v. Wright, 585 F. Supp. 453 (N.D. Tex. 1984), aff'd sub nom. Tasby
v. Black Coalition to Maximize Educ., 771 F.2d 849 (5th Cir. 1985) (South Dallas Educational Centers).
207 E.g., International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 372-76
(1977) (Court considered the legitimate expectations of employees innocent of
wrongdoing).
208 See Local 28, Sheet Metal Workers' Int'l Ass'n v. EEOC, 106 S. Ct. 3019, 3057

(1986); United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 208-09 (1979); cf. Fullilove v.
Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 484 (1980) (plurality opinion) (remedies to cure effects of prior
discrimination may require "sharing of the burden" by innocent parties).
2
09 See Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 283 (1986) (plurality opinion);
Firefighters Local Union No. 1784 v. Stotts, 467 U.S. 561 (1984). In cases brought
under Title VII, courts will determine the interests of nonminority employees under
§ 703 (voluntary remedies) and § 706(g) (court ordered remedies). See Local No. 93,
Int'l Ass'n of Firefighters v. City of Cleveland, 106 S. Ct. at 3073 n.8; Weber, 443 U.S.
at 197. In cases brought under the fourteenth amendment challenging voluntary action
by public employers, the Court uses an equal protection analysis to evaluate the decree's
effect. See, e.g., Wygant, 476 U.S. 267 (1986). The Court is split on the issue of the
difference, if any, in the two standards. Justices Brennan, Marshall, Powell, Blackmun,
and Stevens have opined that Title VII may allow conduct that would be prohibited by
the fourteenth amendment. Johnson v. Transportation Agency, Santa Clara County,
107 S. Ct. 1442, 1449 n.6 (1987). Justices O'Connor, Scalia, White and Rehnquist
would find that Title VII requires at least as much as the Constitution. Id. at 1463
(O'Connor, J., concurring), 1469 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Cf Regents of Univ. of Cal. v.
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The weight a court will give absentee interests also varies with the
specificity of the remedy provisions of the applicable statute. Congress often expresses general goals or policies in enacting fundamental social and economic legislation. Consequently, judges are left a
wide measure of discretion in awarding remedies under such
statutes.210
The Court places more weight on congressional intent and less
weight on absentee-party expectations when it deals with a statute
specifically addressinp relief Title VII, for example, contains a separate section describing the relief appropriate under the Act.2"' The
Act also contains specific provisions limiting the cause of action and
the type of relief that courts can order. 2 Therefore, debates about
the propriety of remedies for Title VII violations tend to center
more on the congressional intent behind these provisions and on the
meaning of the statutory language than on the balancing of competing interests.2 13 The Court gives less weight to absentee interests
inconsistent with the congressional goals of the legislation than it
gives to interests supported by the language and legislative history
of the statute.2 1 4
The Court's treatment of Title VII remedies contrasts with its
Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978) (considering the difference, if any, between Title VI and
equal protection analyses).
210 Chayes, supra note 1, at 1314. In 1978, Congress amended Title VII to include
discrimination based on pregnancy in response to the Court's ruling in General Elec.
Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125 (1976), which held that pregnancy policies did not discriminate against women.
211 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1982).
212 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) states:
No order of the court shall require the admission or reinstatement of an individual as a member of a union, or the hiring, reinstatement, or promotion of
an individual as an employee, . . . if such individual was refused admission,
suspended, or expelled, or was refused employment or advancement or was
suspended or discharged for any reason other than discrimination ... in violation of section 2000e-3(a) of this title.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (1982) states:
Notwithstanding any other provision of this subchapter, it shall not be an
unlawful employment practice for an employer to apply different standards of
compensation, or different terms, conditions, or privileges of employment pursuant to a bona fide seniority or merit system,... provided that such diffeerences [sic] are not the result of an intention to discriminate because of race
See, e.g., Sheet Metal Workers, 106 S. Ct. 3019, 3045-47 (Brennan, J.).
Compare Stotts, which cites the seniority protection portion of Title VII, with
Weber, which does not. See Sheet Metal Workers, 106 S. Ct. at 3048 (opinion of Brennan, J.) (distinguishing Stotts because of the effect of the seniority provisions of § 703(h)
of Title VII).
213

214
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interest balancing under statutes that lack explicit remedy provisions. The proxy provisions of the Securities Exchange Act,2 15 for
example, contain no specific statutory remedy. Even the existence
of a private right of action under the statute had to await judicial
determination.2 16 Therefore, when the Court balances interests
under section 14 of the Act, congressional intent is not decisive.
Instead, the Court relies on general equitable balancing, and often
gives the interests of absentee parties sufficient weight to prevent the
unscrambling of an unlawful merger.2 1 7
2.

Local Government Interests Versus Individual Interests

A recurring problem associated with federal injunctive relief
against state or local governments is the extent to which such a
decree will interfere with the operation of that government. This
problem is inherent in the federal system. Thus, the Court weighs
state and local government interests quite heavily.
The Court weighs two kinds of governmental interests against the
desirability of the plaintiffs' requested injunctive relief. One interest
is the avoidance of administrative inconvenience. In the school desegregation cases, the Court mentioned administrative inconveniences such as busing logistics, the physical condition of school
buildings, personnel needs, administration of redistricting, 2' 8 taxes,
school bonds, supply purchasing, and school board elections2 19 as
factors to consider in structuring a remedy.
The second type of governmental interest that deters the Court
from ordering injunctive relief against state governments revolves
around federalism concerns. The Court has repeatedly mandated
that judges use great care in applying federal equitable power to
control state administration of state law.22 ° Considerations of federalism are a powerful force influencing remedial decrees, particularly when the proposed remedy threatens to interfere with the
215 15 U.S.C. § 78n (1982).
216 See J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964).
217 See, e.g., Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375, 386 (1970).
218 Brown v. Board of Educ., 349 U.S. 294, 300-01 (1955) (Brown II).
219 Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 743 (1974) (Milliken I).
220 For example, in Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976), the Court rejected a remedy
for police brutality that had been prepared by the police department under court order.
The Court based its rejection on the" 'special delicacy of the adjustment to be preserved
between federal equitable power and State administration of its own law.' " Id. at 378
(quoting Stefanelli v. Minard, 342 U.S. 117, 120 (1951) (an early abstention exclusionary rule case)). For a comment on the interaction of principles of federalism and equity
in Rizzo, see L. TRIBE, supra note 104, § 3-41, at 156 (1978).
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internal affairs of a state. Thus, in the school desegregation cases,
local governmental interests played a major role in limiting equitable relief.22 Individual concerns, such as the amount of time children spent on buses,2 22 were mentioned less frequently. However,
when the interests of third parties were expressed in state statutes,
the Court afforded those interests more weight. For example, when
the preamble to a state statute embodied the interests of parents
objecting to busing, the Court legitimized those interests and gave
them great weight.2 23 However, in a private school case, in. ich
there were no governmental parties, the Court gave the interests of
white parents and school administrators only cursory treatment.2 2 4
Even in cases brought under federal statutes, as opposed to the
Constitution, the Court may give governmental interests more
weight than personal interests. While problems of federalism and
governmental administration are not usually a factor in Title VII
cases, they may become important when the employer is a governmental body. The Court's reluctance to shift the remedial burden
to the municipal government in Manhart is illustrative.2 2 5
Although the Court attributed its reluctance to impose retroactive
relief to the expectations of retired employees, Justice Marshall
noted that any effect on retired employees could have been avoided
226
by putting the burden on the discriminating city.
221 See Milliken I, 418 U.S. at 741-43; Brown H, 349 U.S. at 299-301.
222 Swann v. Chirlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 29-31 (1971).
223 See, e.g., Crawford v. Board of Educ., 458 U.S. 527, 545 (1982) (The Court held
that since the proposition's stated purpose-to further the public interest-was legitimate and nondiscriminatory, the Court would not dispute the lower court's judgment
that the proposition was valid.).
224 Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160 (1976). This difference in treatment, however,
may also be due to the fact that the issue in Runyon was violation rather than remedy.
Cf. City of Los Angeles Dep't of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 721-23
(1978) (absentee interests did not affect finding a violation, but prevented awarding retroactive relief).
225
Manhart, 35 U.S. at 719-21.
226 Id. at 732 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Similarly, in
Stotts those justices who invalidated the layoff protection remedy relied on the interests
of white employees. Firefighters Local Union No. 1784 v. Stotts, 467 U.S. 561 (1984).
As Justice Blackmun pointed out, however, the district court did not order the city to
lay off any employees, and the city could have avoided the problem by finding an alternative to layoffs to solve its financial crisis. Id. at 605 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Voter
redistricting cases also demonstrate the different weight given to individual and governmental interests. In those cases which assert the political interests of local governments
or governmental administrative problems, such interests weigh heavily against a full
and immediate remedy. See, e.g., Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 583-85 (1964) (concerns with governmental stability and continuity, and the complexities of election laws,
should be considered when deciding the immediateness of relief). This can be con-
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Extent of Disruption Caused by the Remedy

The more widespread the disruption an equitable remedy is apt to
cause, the greater the weight the Court will give to interests that
advocate less disruption. "[T]he interest in immediate protection of
constitutional rights may be offset by the disruptive effects of injunctive relief ... 227
This principle can be observed in the Supreme Court's desegregation and employment discrimination decisions. In desegregation
cases, in which a remedy giving complete relief affects a school system or perhaps a whole city, the interests of absent parties figure
more prominently than they do in most employment cases, in which
the disruption will be confined to one company's employment
practices.
The Court does not, however, wholly ignore disruption in employment discrimination cases. The problem of company disorder
may have been the basis for the Court's suggestion in Franks22 and
Teamsters229 that the remedy should vary with the number of people involved. Disruption also may explain the difference between
the hiring cases and the layoff cases. Hiring and promotion goals
affect specific individual applicants, but on a theoretical plane they
also affect a larger and less identifiable group. Fictional seniority, at
least at the time of the award, is also less disruptive than layoffs, as
it does not allow a minority employee to replace a nonminority
worker.2 3 ° Protection from layoff, however, can result in specifically identifiable employees losing their jobs, 231' a situation which
the Court has yet to find acceptable.2 32 Even in awarding damages,
trasted with the small effect given white voter interests: so long as they are not fenced
out, their interests do not change the black voters' remedy. United Jewish Orgs. of
Williamsburgh, Inc. v. Carey, 430 U.S. 144, 165-66 (1977).
227 Developments in the Law-Injunctions, 78 HARV. L. REV. 994, 1007 (1965).
228 Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747, 799 n.20 (1976) (Powell, J., joined
by Rehnquist, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
229 International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 376 n.62 (1977).
2 30
See Firefighters Local Union No. 1784 v. Stotts, 467 U.S. 561, 579 (1984) ("Even
when an individual shows that the discriminatory practice has had an impact on him,
he is not automatically entitled to have a nonminority employee laid off to make room
for him. He may have to wait until a vacancy occurs, and if there are nonminority
employees on layoff, the court must balance the equities in determining who is entitled
to the job.") (footnote omitted) (citing Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 371 76).
231 Unless the court prohibits the employer from shifting the company's economic
burdens to employees through use of layoffs.
232 [T]he petitioners before us today are not 'the white teachers as a group.'
They are Wendy Wygant and other individuals who claim that they were fired
from their jobs because of their race .... The Constitution does not allocate
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disruption can be significant. The payment of damages and readjustment of assessment schedules were factors the Court considered
in denying retroactive relief in Manhart.23 3
Another kind of disruption that weighs in the Court's balancing
is one that arguably should be ignored: public hostility to the remedy. Justice Marshall suggested that, beginning with Milliken I,234
the Court's limit on school desegregation remedies arose not out of
legal principles, but out of a perceived public belief that the courts
had gone far enough. 23 5 Perhaps a strong public aversion to preferential layoff protection also helps support the hiring/layoff distinction in affirmative action remedy cases.
Some commentators have suggested that the Court's limits on
remedies spring from hostility toward civil liberties rather than
from principles of equitable interest balancing. One commentator
voiced the suspicion "that at bottom [the Court's] procedural stance
betokens a lack of sympathy with the substantive results and with
the idea of the district courts as a vehicle of social and economic
reform. ' 236 Another characterized the Burger Court's first years as
a "sad period of ... activism [against individuals and minorities]
cloaked in the worn-out if well-meant disguise of judicial restraint. '23 7 Nevertheless, public hostility, at least if it does not
reach the level of an affront to the Court's authority,2 38 is a factor
that may limit injunctive relief.
4.

Third-PartyAbility to Thwart the Remedy
If third-party resisters have the ability to subvert the remedy or-

constitutional rights to be distributed like bloc grants within discrete racial
groups; and until it does, petitioners' more senior union colleagues cannot vote
away petitioners' rights.
Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 281 n.8, (1986) (plurality opinion of
Powell, J., joined by Burger, C.J., Rehnquist, J., and O'Connor, J.).
233 The court considered the potential disruption which would be caused by requiring
the defendant to pay large damage awards and change current insurance and pension
plan rules as a factor in deciding to deny retroactive relief in Manhart and Norris. City
of Los Angeles Dep't of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 721-23 (1978).
234 Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974).
235 "Today's holding, I fear, is more a reflection of a perceived public mood that we
have gone far enough in enforcing the Constitution's guarantee of equal justice than it is
the product of neutral principles of law." Id. at 814 (Marshall, J., joined by Douglas, J.,
Brennan, J., and White, J., dissenting).
236 Chayes, supra note 1, at 1305.
237 L. TRIBE, supra note 104.
238 Wright v. Council of Emporia, 407 U.S. 451, 456-59 (1972); Monroe v. Board of
Comm'rs, 391 U.S. 450, 454-57 (1968).
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dered by the Court, their potential resistance may affect the remedy
ultimately ordered. While the Court will not tolerate open resistance, 239 resistance in the form of retreat and abstention seems to
limit the remedies that courts will order.
A classic example of resistance is white flight, the decision of
white families that are unhappy with desegregation remedies to
leave the school system.2 " In this context, individual families may
balance the interests at issue differently than courts. "The decision
to flee ...

is made when private individuals conclude that the net

costs of the remedy to them, as they perceive and evaluate the remedial costs, exceed the net costs of fleeing." 2 4 ' If significant numbers
of white families leave a school system, integration will no longer be
possible because not enough nonminority children will be left to desegregate the system. Thus, the ability to flee is the ability to render
a remedy ineffective. When third parties are able to resist by retreat
and abstention, as white families are able to do in school desegregation cases, courts seem to give greater weight to the third-party
2
interests.

24

In contrast, white flight is not a significant factor in forming remedies in employment discrimination cases. Although some people
might leave a job rather than work with minorities, such defections
seem unlikely. Further, court ordered integration of the workplace
does not cause the kind of temporary adverse consequences which
may result from desegregation remedies. 24 3 This difference may
See supra note 236.
Although numerous factors lead to white movement away from central cities, recent studies tend to agree that desegregation remedies hasten their exit. See Rossell,
Applied Social Science Research: What Does It Say About the Effectiveness of School
Desegregation Plans?, 12 J.LEGAL STUD. 69, 85-87, 93 (1983).
241 Gewirtz, supra note 13, at 634 (emphasis in original).
242 For examples of courts fine-tuning their desegregation orders to minimize the effects on third parties, see Clark v. Board of Educ., 705 F.2d 265, 269-72 (8th Cir. 1983);
Bradley v. Milliken, 620 F.2d 1143, 1151-53 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 870
(1980): United States v. Board of tduc., 554 F. Supp. 912, 924-26 (N.D. Il. 1983);
Smiley v. Blevins, 514 F. Supp. 1248, 1257-58 n.22, 1259-60 (S.D. Tex. 1981); Norwalk
CORE v. Norwalk Bd. of Educ., 298 F. Supp. 213 (D. Conn. 1969), aff'd, 423 F.2d 121
(2d Cir. 1970).
243 Desegregation remedies often require a readjustment of student attendance zones,
student transportation, staff assignments, bulding use, and the location of special programs. The remedy may affect thousands of children and their families. Where the
segregated system included schools that were separate but unequal, integration may
introduce white students to the effects of inferior programs and physical plant. In the
workplace, by contrast, the effects of a small shift in the racial composition of the
workforce should be minimal.
239

240
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contribute to the fact that white expectations receive less weight in
employment cases than they do in desegregation cases.
5.

Source of the Remedy

In institutional reform litigation, the Court's decree sometimes
results from interparty negotiation, thus partially eliminating the
"danger of intruding on an elaborate and organic network of...
relationships." 2" A remedy imposed by a court may not have this
advantage.
At times, the standard of review the Court applies to a remedy
depends on the source of the remedy. Whether the defendant suggested the remedy or whether it was imposed by the trial judge is
very important to the Court. In Milliken 1,245 the Court carefully
pointed out that "[t]his is not a situation where the District Court
appears to have acted solely according to its own notions of good
educational policy unrelated to the demands of the Constitution."246 Local school boards can provide remedies that a court
could not order. Thus, although a court cannot order continuous
adjustments to maintain racial balance,24 7 a local school board may
make such adjustments voluntarily.2 4 8 Similarly, in legislative reapportionment cases the origin of the remedy is highly significant.
The Court does not scrutinize a plan created by the legislature as
carefully as it considers one imposed by a district court.24 9 Apparently, the assumption underlying this principle is that the defendant, at least when it is a governmental entity, is more likely to have
considered all relevant interests.
244 Chayes, supra note 1, at 1299. There are many forces which encourage parties to
embody their settlements in consent decrees. First, consent decrees are subject to continuing oversight and interpretation by the court. Second, a consent decree may be
easier to enforce than a contract. Third, litigation concerning a consent decree will go
to the court which entered the decree, thus avoiding multiple forums and duplication of
effort. Local No. 93, Int'l Ass'n of Firefighters v. City of Cleveland, 106 S. Ct. 3076,
3082 n. 13 (1986) (quoting Schwareschild, Public Law by Private Bargain: Title VII
Consent Decrees and the Fairnessof Negotiated Institutional Reform, 1984 DUKE L.J.
887, 889 and Brief for National League of Cities as Amicus Curiae 25).
245 Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267 (1977) (Milliken II).
246 Id. at 278 (quoting Bradley v. Milliken, 540 F.2d 229, 241-42, aff'd, 433 U.S. 267
(1976)).
247 Pasadena City Bd. of Educ. v. Spangler, 427 U.S. 424, 434-35 (1976).
248 Martin v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 626 F.2d 1165, 1167 (4th Cir.
1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1041 (1981).
249 Wise v. Lipscomb, 437 U.S. 535, 540 (1978) (plurality opinion of White, J., joined
by Stewart, J.) (quoting Connor v. Finch, 431 U.S. 407, 414 (1977)). This is true even
when the legislature acts under pressure from federal authorities. See United Jewish
Orgs. of Williamsburgh, Inc. v. Carey, 430 U.S. 144, 168 n.25 (1977) (by implication).
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In employment discrimination cases, the Court usually gives
more leeway to remedies arising out of settlement agreements and
consent decrees than to those imposed by a court. In Local 93, InternationalAssociation of Firefighters v. City of Cleveland,25 ° the
Court upheld a consent decree entered into by plaintiffs and the city
employer over the objection of the union, noting that "a federal
court is not necessarily barred from entering a consent decree
merely because the decree provides broader relief than the court
could have awarded after a trial."2 5
Likewise, in Weber,2 52 Fullilove,25 3 and Johnson,2 54 the voluntary
nature of the remedy influenced the Court. The strong policy favoring settlement of employment discrimination cases supports greater
deference to agreed remedies. The Court has repeatedly noted that
Congress intended voluntary compliance to be the preferred means
of meeting the Title VII objectives. 2 55 The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, the agency charged with investigating
claims of employment discrimination, also encourages affirmative
action and voluntary settlement.2 56
Even in fully litigated cases, trial courts sometimes circulate proposed remedial orders among the parties for comments, corrections,
or suggestions. 257 This procedure provides an opportunity for the
court and the parties to fine tune the remedy ordered and eliminates
some possible challenges.
6. Administration of the Remedy
The Court appears more willing to enter a decree that will disap106 S. Ct. 3063 (1986).
Id. at 3077.
252 United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979).
253 448 U.S. 448 (1980). Voluntary agreements, however, may not provide relief
which violates the underlying statute or the Constitution, and may not dispose of the
claims of third parties. Local No. 93, 106 S. Ct. at 3077-79 (1986); Firefighters Local
Union No. 1784 v. Stotts, 467 U.S. 561, 575 (1984).
254 Johnson v. Transportation Agency, Santa Clara County, 107 S. Ct. 1442, 1451
(1987).
255 See Local No. 93, 106 S.Ct. at 3072; see also Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422
U.S. 405, 417-18 (1975) (quoting United States v. N.L. Indus., 479 F.2d 354, 379 (8th
Cir. 1973)) (the purposes of Title VII can be achieved by the prospect of a court ordered
backpay award which "provide[s] the spur or catalyst which causes employers and unions to self-examine and to self-evaluate their employment practices .
256 29 C.F.R. §§ 1608.1(b)-(c) (1987).
257 See, e.g., Gaba, Informal Rulemaking by Settlement Agreement, 73 GEO. L.J.
1241 (1985) (discussing agreements reached between private parties and any governmental agencies after private parties file lawsuits challenging a rule).
250
251
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point nonparty expectations if a group exists that can administer the
remedy. In part, this difference is based on the traditional judicial
distaste for prolonged court involvement in administering remedies.
The view that such long term judicial activism can be improper influenced the Court's decision in Pasadena City Board of Education
v. Spangler.2" 8 In that case, the Court held that the district judge
exceeded his authority in deciding to supervise the racial composition of Pasadena schools during the judge's tenure." 9
In eipiOyfierit

dsrm-ntlon

aes, emsployers~ or unin

po

vide ready administrators. The Court may impose new employment policies, but the same people will administer those policies as
are generally charged with the company's personnel function. A
remedy that gives plaintiffs full relief may therefore place no extra
administrative burdens on the federal courts and is more likely to be
upheld. Also, some of the Justices see a union's participation in
remedy formation as some representation of absentee interests. 26'
The remedy administrator's importance to the Court is demonstrated most clearly by contrasting two interdistrict remedy cases:
Milliken J26' and Hills v. Gatreaux.262 In Milliken I, the Court
found the administrative problems insuperable. Consequently, the
Court declined to supervise the restructuring of state and local
school administration to coordinate relief.263 In Hills, a housing

case, the Court distinguished Milliken I since the wrongdoer in
Hills, the Department of Housing and Urban Development, could
administer an interdistrict remedy. "[A] metropolitan area remedy
258 427 U.S. 424 (1976).
259 Id. at 438-40.
260 Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 312 (1986) (Marshall, J., joined by
Brennan, J., and Blackmun, J., dissenting); Id. at 317-18 (Stevens, J., dissenting);
United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 197 (1979); cf. Firefighters Local Union
No. 1784 v. Stotts, 467 U.S. 561, 588 n.3 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("[I]f innocent employees are to be required to make any sacrifices in the final consent decree, they
must be represented and have had full participation rights in the negotiation process.").
But see Wygant, 478 U.S. at 281 n.8 (opinion of Powell, J., joined by Burger, C.J., and
Rehnquist, J.). ("The Constitution does not allocate constitutional rights to be distributed like block grants within discrete racial groups; and until it does, petitioners' more
senior union colleagues cannot vote away petitioners' rights.").
261 Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974) (Milliken I).
262 425 U.S. 284 (1976).
2 63
Milliken I, 418 U.S. at 743-44. Cf United States v. Board of School Comm'rs,
368 F. Supp. 1191, 1205 (S.D. Ind.) (ordering interdistrict relief, but allowing the Indiana General Assembly "a reasonable time" in which to devise and implement a remedy), aff'd, 483 F.2d 1406 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 413 U.S. 920 (1973). For a history of
this case, see Marsh, The Indianapolis Experience: The Anatomy of a Desegregation
Case, 9 IND. L. REV. 897 (1976).
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involving HUD need not displace the rights and powers accorded
' 26
suburban governmental entities under federal or state law.
7. Summary of Balancing Trends: The Importance of Being
Public
The six judicial considerations outlined above do not occur in isolation. They coexist and overlap, sometimes reinforcing one another and sometimes competing for prominence. In addition, the
application of these considerations differs between private-party
cases and cases involving local government defendants.
Institutional reform litigation is sometimes a contest between private parties. 265 However, the litigants' private status does not eliminate the presence of third-party interests. For example, in securities
cases the interests of absent shareholders may be affected by any
injunctive relief ordered,26 6 just as the interests of white employees
in employment discrimination cases may be affected.2 67 Yet the equitable balancing in these cases does not differ markedly from the
traditional model unless the remedy ordered violates the underlying
statute. "[T]he immediate parties' interests [are] to be weighed and
evaluated, [after which the court will] proceed to [consider] other
268
interests that might be affected by the order.
When the defendant is a local government, the scales are tipped
from the beginning. In such cases, the Court applies a rule that
Justice Stewart found applicable in another context: "The Government always wins."'269 If a state does not win on the merits, it often
succeeds in persuading the Court to give great weight to governmental concerns in structuring a remedy.
In some ways, the defendant's status as a local government affects
each of the six judicial considerations discussed above. That the
264 Hills, 425 U.S. at 298 n.13.
265 See, e.g., United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979); Franks v. Bowman
Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747 (1976); Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160 (1976); Mills v.
Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375 (1970).
266 See, e.g., Mills, 396 U.S. at 388 ("[A] determination of what relief should be
granted ... must hinge on whether setting aside the merger would be in the best interests of the shareholders as a whole.").
267 See, e.g., Weber, 443 U.S. at 201 (although recognizing that race based affirmative
action plans discriminate against whites, the Court upheld the plan because it was voluntarily entered into by private parties "to eliminate traditional patterns of racial
segregation.").
268 Chayes, supra note 1, at 1293.
269 United States v. Von's Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270, 301 (1966) (Stewart, J.,
dissenting).
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Court gives more weight to absentee interests in constitutional litigation may stem from the fact that a constitutional claim generally
requires a government defendant. Thus, the limited remedies afforded plaintiffs in these cases may reflect deference to government.
Additionally, an equitable decree imposed on a governmental defendant is more likely to cause greater disruption. Such a remedy is
likely to affect large numbers of people either directly or indirectly,
through budget reallocations caused by the court's order. Consequently, when a remedy requires the creation of a new govermental agency270 or a new governmental body representing multiple
local governments, 7 1 the Court is extremely unlikely to impose the
remedy.
Even when other factors work in favor of a remedy, governmental interests can prevent it. For example, although local school
boards can implement desegregation plans, the attendant administrative difficulties are given great weight. Even decrees that cause
minimal disruption, such as those that require only mathematical
calculations and the repayment of money, are sometimes rejected as
too burdensome on absentee interests and on local government.2 7 2
B.

Evaluating the Patterns

The Court has adopted an interest-balancing approach to making
equitable relief decisions in institutional reform cases. Interest balancing was derived from early equity cases involving actions such as
nuisance or trespass. However, courts hearing those early cases
subjected the plaintiff's rights to balancing only when those rights
were minimal. Today, in the institutional reform cases, the Court
applies balancing principles to cases in which the plaintiff has been
deprived of important constitutional or statutory rights instead of
minimal property rights.
The early equity courts balanced interests for a number of reasons. They balanced to adjust the timing of a remedy to minimize
disruption. 273 They balanced to permit methods of granting full relief that were less onerous to defendants. 2 74 They balanced to grant
270

See Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976).
Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974) (Milliken I).
272 City of Los Angeles Dep't of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702 (1978).
273 See, e.g., New Jersey v. City of New York, 283 U.S. 473 (1931) (allowing the city
reasonable time to build incinerators, rather than immediately banning garbage disposal); Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911) (final decree delayed for at
least six months, in view of possible injury to public if immediately granted).
274 See, e.g., New Jersey v. City of New York, 283 U.S. 473 (1931) (allowing defend271
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greater relief to plaintiffs than would have been available at law.2 75
In cases in which the plaintiffs' rights were minimal and the public
interest was great, the courts balanced such interests and refused to
grant equitable relief, giving money damages instead.2 76 However,
the early equity courts did not balance away plaintiffs' important
rights and leave them without a remedy.27 7
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court has relied on established principles of equity to support its interest-balancing approach to institutional reform cases which, in many cases, balanced away plaintiffs'
rights. To a great extent, the Court's lack of candor about what was
actually being balanced allowed plaintiffs' interests to be defeated.
In Brown II, the Court spoke only of small delays to accommodate
transitional difficulties and local conditions. There is some precedent for such delays in certain cases.2 71 In addition, the equitable
principles cited in Swann might support a fine tuning of remedies to
minimize the amount of time children spend on buses, or to avoid
disruption of the educational process.27 9 Precedent does not, however, support all of the balancing choices that the Court has made.
As a result of its loose application of precedent and its ad hoc
approach to balancing in institutional reform litigation, the
Supreme Court has erred in certain systematic ways. Those errors
ant time to adapt before implementing injunction); Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co.,
206 U.S. 230 (1907) (allowing defendant time to reduce toxic fumes before issuing
injunction).
275 See, e.g., SEC v. United States Realty & Improvement Co., 310 U.S. 434 (1940)
(court may use equity powers to go beyond bankruptcy statutes); United States v. Morgan, 307 U.S. 183 (1939) (court may go beyond a statute to effectuate its remedial goal).
276 See, e.g., Madison v. Ducktown Sulphur, Copper & Iron Co., 113 Tenn. 331, 83
S.W. 658 (1904) (money damages awarded in lieu of injunction against smelter operation); Grey ex rel. Simmons v. Mayor of Paterson, 60 N.J. Eq. 335, 45 A. 995 (1900) (no
injunction against a city sewer system).
277 Compare Murtfeldt v. New York, W.S. & B. Ry., 102 N.Y. 703, 7 N.E. 404 (1886)
(refusing to enforce a contract to erect a private crossing when the location of the road
made construction difficult and the crossing would be of no value to plaintiff), with Fox
v. Spokane Int'l Ry., 26 Idaho 60, 140 P. 1103 (1914) (enforcing a similar contract
when construction was of approximately the same difficulty, but the crossing would be
useful to plaintiff). Cf. H. MCCLINTOCK, supra note 17, § 145, at 388 ("When the
defendant who is committing legal wrong asks equity to balance the hardship to him
against the injury he is inflicting on plaintiff, he ought not to prevail because of a mere
difference in the money injury suffered.").
278 See City of Los Angeles Dep't of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702
(1978).
279 However, when he set these factors out in Swann, Chief Justice Burger cited no
cases to support the balancing of time on a school bus against effective integration.
Rather, he relied on general principles of equity, citing Hecht Co. v. Bowles, 321 U.S.
321 (1944). See supra text accompanying notes 12, 54, and 64-67.
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have resulted in overvaluing the interests of nonparties or undervaluing the rights of successful plaintiffs. More specifically, the Court
has (1) balanced interests that should not be balanced, (2) mischaracterized certain interests in ways that overstate or understate
their importance, and (3) given too much weight to some interests
and too little weight to others. These errors have distorted the
Court's balancing process and led to results that generally favor the
government at the expense of individuals and third parties at the
expense of, plaintllifsU.
1. Balancing the Unbalanceable
Although the Court may legitimately balance competing social
goals against a full remedy for plaintiffs, it should not give independent weight to third-party resistance to the plaintiffs' rights.
In school desegregation cases and, to a lesser degree, in employment
discrimination cases, the Court has let such resistance influence its
decisions.2 80
In school desegregation cases, for example, resistance has always
been a factor. In Brown II, the likelihood of public opposition was
an unspoken motivation behind the Court's tolerance of "all deliberate speed., 2s1 As time passed, resistance gained increasing acceptance as a factor to be balanced. Justice Powell's opinions, for
example, recognized white flight as a relevant consideration. 28 2 The
Crawford majority's acceptance of "preserving harmony" as a neutral and acceptable legislative goal also seems to give weight to
third-party resistance.28 3
A court cannot realistically ignore third-party resistance to the
plaintiffs' rights. To do so could unwittingly undermine the relief
the court seeks to order. A court could, however, recognize the
existence of such resistance but reject its legitimacy and thus provide more complete relief for the plaintiffs. Further, the Court must
explicitly reject resistance that is purely resistance to the right itself.
On the other hand, the Court should accommodate, to the extent
possible, third-party resistance to the interim effects of a remedy.
280

See supra text accompanying notes 233-36; see infra text accompanying notes 281-

82.
See, e.g., supra note 59.
See Columbus Bd. of Educ. v. Penick, 443 U.S. 449, 484-85 (1979) (Powell, J.,
dissenting); Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189, 250 (1973). See also Estes v.
Metropolitan Branches of the Dallas NAACP, 444 U.S. 437 (1980) (Powell, J.,
dissenting).
283 See Crawford v. Los Angeles Bd. of Educ., 458 U.S. 527, 543 n.29 (1982).
281

282
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Courts can structure remedies to reduce resistance by minimizing
the negative interim effects in ways that do not deny relief to the
plaintiffs.2" 4
The Court's unspoken deference to third-party resistance has
made both of the above-mentioned options impossible. The Court
has neither specifically rejected resistance as a relevant factor in institutional reform litigation balancing, nor suggested or approved
remedies designed to lessen interim resistance. By deferring to
third-party resistance without admitting it, the Court has given
resistance great weight without precedential support for doing so2 5
and has avoided taking steps to minimize resistance by third
parties.2 86
2. Problems of Mischaracterization
At times, the Court's characterization of some rights as private
and others as public has been faulty. First, the Court has treated
the desires of private individuals asserting private interests as public. Second, the Court has characterized as public governmental interests that are no more than the private interests of a governmental
body. As a result, the Court has given excessive weight to interests
opposing complete relief.
The Court, in balancing interests in institutional reform cases,
has said that it balances the plaintiffs' private interests against the
public interest. However, such a flat statement does not explain
why the interests of black children and employees are considered
private while the interests of white children and employers are considered public. By characterizing the preferences of third parties as
"public interests," the Court has given those interests weight that
284See

generally Gewirtz, supra note 13 (emphasizing desegregation and white

flight).
285 See supra text accompanying notes 279-83.
286 Justice Powell's dissent in the Court's dismissal of certiorari in the Dallas school
case, for example, argued for reinstatement of the district court's order that maintained
a number of one-race schools, apparently because he presumed that greater integration
was impossible. Estes v. Metropolitan Branches of the Dallas NAACP, 444 U.S. 437
(1980) (Powell, J., dissenting from dismissal of writs as improvidently granted). On
remand, however, the district court decreased the number of one-race schools and ordered certain educational enhancement remedies, without sacrificing important societal
interests. Tasby v. Wright, 630 F. Supp. 597 (N.D. Tex. 1986) (creating West Dallas
learning centers); Tasby v. Wright, 585 F. Supp. 453 (N.D. Tex. 1984) (creating South
Dallas learning centers), aff'd sub nom. Tasby v. Black Coalition to Maximize Educ.,
771 F.2d 849 (5th Cir. 1985); Tasby v. Wright, 520 F. Supp. 683 (N.D. Tex. 1981),
modified, 713 F.2d 90 (5th Cir. 1983).
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would not be due if the interests of one private group were pitted
against those of another.
Especially in cases involving a governmental defendant, the distinction between the interests of the liable entity and the third parties is unclear. Opposition to the remedy may be termed a desire for
neighborhood schools (private interest) or for compact attendance
zones (public interest). Opposition may be to higher taxes (private
interest) or to excessive remedial costs (public interest).2 87 When
third-party interests are essentially personal, especially whfien they
involve objections to the remedy, the Court should not grant such
interests enhanced status by identifying them with the public interest. Identifying once more the interests of white people with the
interests of "the public" is, at minimum, a kind of dignitary
harm.

28 8

Certain interests asserted by government defendants are properly
characterized as public interests. Insofar as local government represents "the people," the Court should give weight to its interests.
Thus, where local government promotes concerns such as participation in the political process or public health and safety, its interests
are legitimately public. 28 9 However, when the government merely
complains of administrative inconvenience, its interests should be
entitled to no more weight than those of a private litigant. 2"
3.

Problems of Weight

The Court consistently has given insufficient weight to the rights
of plaintiffs in fashioning remedies in institutional reform cases.
Before reaching the remedy stage, plaintiffs have proved that their
constitutional or statutory rights have been violated. Yet the
287 Perhaps because of this, groups opposing remedies have been most successful
when they label their desires governmental interests. See, e.g., Crawford v. Board of
Educ., 458 U.S. 527 (1982) (involving a state referendum amending the state constitution to effectively ban busing).
288 The fact that white employees' expectations are more difficult to characterize as
public may explain why the Court gives less weight to those expectations than it gives to
white parent's objections to desegregation remedies. The Court, however, has not expressly made this distinction and generally analyzes balancing in Title VII cases as being compelled by legislative intent.
289 Governments traditionally function to protect the health, safety and welfare of

their citizens. See, e.g., Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296 (1966) (provision of a park a
public function); Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944) (managing primary elections a
public function).
290 See generally Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 763 (1974) (Milliken I) (White,
J., dissenting, notes that the segregation will be unremedied because of "undue administrative inconvenience.").
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Court's balancing often affords the plaintiffs' rights less weight than
it affords to government inconvenience, the unenforceable expectations of other employees, or extra time on a school bus.
As noted above, the characterization of defendant or third-party
interests as public instead of private may account in part for the
Court's undervaluing of plaintiffs' rights. Plaintiffs' interests are
also undervalued by the Court's misuse of the balancing process.
By using old equity cases in which the plaintiffs' interests were negligible as precedent, the Court sometimes ignores the importance of
the plaintiffs' rights.2 9 ' Interest balancing in equity is a timehonored process which is not unique to institutional reform cases.
It is used properly, however, only when the Court gives the plaintiffs' rights due weight and does not eliminate meaningful remedies.
In comparing the value of certain remedial benefits with other social
interests, "the social benefit of the right and the interest in undoing
effects of its violation must be given exceptional weight in the balance; otherwise the Constitution's [and various statutes'] allocations
of rights would be subject to a de novo utilitarian reevaluation in
292
particular cases."
Another flaw in the Court's balancing approach to remedies issues in institutional reform cases is the excessive weight that the
Court has given the defendants' interests. This overvaluing is due
in part to the mischaracterization discussed above.29 3 The Court
also has overvalued defendants' interests by its unwillingness to
shift the burden of remedies from the plaintiffs or third parties onto
defendants. For example, in school cases, the Court has not required school districts to spend money to improve dramatically the
quality of education for all students in order to lessen white resistance and the problems resulting from the transition to a unitary
school system.
Likewise, in the employment discrimination context, the Court
did not require the government employers in Manhart and Norris to
absorb the cost of a retroactive remedy in order to compensate
plaintiffs without harming retired employees. Nor has the Court
required government employers in financial straits to find moneysaving alternatives to layoffs in order to protect the interests of both
291

See, e.g., Knoth v. Manhattan Ry., 187 N.Y. 243, 79 N.E. 1015 (N.Y. App. 1907);

Madison v. Ducktown Sulphur, Copper & Iron Co., 113 Tenn. 331, 83 S.W. 658 (1904);
Grey ex rel. Simmons v. Mayor of Paterson, 60 N.J. Eq. 335, 45 A. 995 (1900).
292 Gewirtz, supra note 13, at 607.
293 See supra text accompanying notes 284-87.
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plaintiffs and third parties. Instead, the Court has viewed the issues
narrowly as conflicts between the plaintiffs and third parties without looking at ways to shift the remedial burden to the defendant.
Additionally, the Court sometimes has given excessive weight to
the interests of third parties. Again, this is due in part to the
Court's deference to resistance and to its mischaracterization of interests as public or private. Further, the Court's deference to legally unenforceable "expectations" has caused it to overvalue thirdparty interests. In employment cases, for example, even when discrimination against identified plaintiffs has been proved,29 4 the
Court may balance the expectations of white employees against the
value of a complete remedy to the plaintiff. In reviewing remedies
provided to groups that may include persons who are not identified
victims of discrimination, the Court has given even more weight to
employee expectations.2 95 Yet in most states these employees have
no enforceable legal right to continued employment.2 96
The Court's deference to third-party expectations stems from a
feeling that innocent parties should not bear the cost of a remedy.
Undeniably, an effective remedy is sometimes impossible without
imposing direct costs on selected third parties who did not violate
the law. The extent to which this is unfair, however, will vary in
ways not currently factored into the Court's balancing approach.
For example, incumbent employees may have benefited from an employer's historic discrimination against minorities,2 97 and white parents and children may have benefited from segregated schooling
through lower taxes or better "white" schools. Further, third parties may have contributed to discrimination as upper-level employ294See, e.g., International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 375
(1977) (The Court acknowledged that balancing the expectations of innocent third parties was necessary, but declined to do so because of the limited facts on record.).
295 Wygant v.Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 283-84 (1986) (less intrusive means
of achieving racial balance than race-based layoff plan could be found, such as hiring
goals).
296 Most states uphold the "termination-at-will" doctrine. See, e.g., White v. Chelsea
Indus., 425 So.2d 1090 (Ala. 1983); Mau v. Omaha Nat'l Bank, 207 Neb. 308, 299
N.W.2d 147 (1980); Larsen v. Motor Supply Co., 117 Ariz. 507, 573 P.2d 907 (Ariz.
App. 1977).
297 See, e.g., Johnson v. Transportation Agency, Santa Clara County, 107 S.Ct. 1442,
1068 (1987) ("the whites promoted since 1972 were the specific beneficiaries of an official policy which systematically excluded all blacks"); Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S.
448, 484-85 (1980) (Burger, C.J.) (upholding law requiring that 10% of federal funds
granted for public works projects be used to procure services from minority owned
businesses).
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ees making discriminatory job decisions or as voters supporting a
segregationist school board.
While the Court has considered the nature of costs imposed in its
remedial interest balancing,29 it has not examined the relationship
between the defendant and the costbearers. To the extent that such
determinations are possible, an analysis of culpability would be
preferable to a blanket presumption of innocence.
Since the Court has not attempted to examine the presumption of
innocence, other than by judicial notice, it has not confronted the
conflicts between this assumption and the way it has balanced certain interests. In employment cases, for example, the Court gives
more weight to the interests of incumbent employees than to the
interests of applicants. However, current employees are more likely
to have been the perpetrators or beneficiaries of prior discrimination
while applicants are more likely to be innocent. A presumption of,
and deference to, third-party innocence again overvalues thirdparty interests in relation to the plaintiffs' interests.
IV
ARE THE THIRD PARTIES REALLY ABSENT?

Despite the apparent weight that the Court gives third-party interests, various groups2 99 and commentators 3°° have expressed concern that these interests are unrepresented and thus undervalued.
In many cases, however, the affected third parties either participate
directly in the litigation or are represented indirectly by the
defendant.3 ° '
Sometimes the affected parties actually intervene in the remedy
stage of the lawsuit or bring suit as the original plaintiffs. For example, in the employment discrimination area, remedy issues are
298 For example, the Court's analysis of third-party rights in employment discrimination cases varies according to the kind of burden and size of the affected group. See,
e.g., Local No. 28, Sheet Metal Workers' Int'l Ass'n v. EEOC, 106 S. Ct. 3019, 3061
(1986) ("[Gloals . . . should not unnecessarily trammel the interests of nonminority
employees."). In school cases, the Court considers time spent on buses. Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1970).
299 See, e.g., Bustop v. Superior Court, 69 Cal. App. 3d 66, 137 Cal. Rptr. 793 (1977)
(Bustop, an anti-busing organization, sued for intervention in a busing ordinance case.).
3
00 See Note, InstitutionalReform Litigation: Representation in the Remedial Process, 91 YALE L.J. 1474 (1982).
301 Government defendants or court appointed citizen committees often hold hearings during the remedy formation process which give affected parties a chance to assert
their interests. See, e.g., Jones v. Caddo Parish School Bd., 487 F.2d 1275 (5th Cir.
1973) (biracial committee held seven public hearings concerning possible remedies).
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often raised by white plaintiffs bringing reverse discrimination
claims. In Weber, Fullilove, Johnson and Wygant, white persons affected by a remedy brought suit. In Stotts and Local 93, a union
dominated by white employees appealed the court-ordered
remedies.
Similarly, in school desegregation cases white parents sometimes
bring lawsuits or intervene in existing cases.3 °2 In Swann, for example, a group of lower-income white parents intervened to argue that
they bore an inequitable amount of the remedy's burden.3
r, two
cases, classroom teachers intervened to assert their interests in shaping the proposed remedy.3 "4 Additionally, white parents hostile to
student-assignment remedies3 5 have intervened in a number of
cases. 30 6 At the implementation stage, a number of school districts
302 Martin v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 626 F.2d 1165 (4th Cir. 1980)
(plaintiffs brought suit to enjoin Board's implementation of pupil reassignment plan).
In Hines v. Rapides Parish School Bd., 479 F.2d 762 (5th Cir. 1973), a group of parents
wishing to challenge a pupil assignment plan tried to bring their own lawsuit but were
instructed that they should instead intervene in the existing school case.
303 Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 362 F. Supp. 1223, 1229
(W.D.N.C. 1973) (intervenors included low and middle-income whites), appeal dismissed, 489 F.2d 966 (4th Cir. 1974).
304 Little Rock School Dist. v. Pulaski County Special School Dist. No. 1, 738 F.2d
82 (8th Cir. 1984); Marsh, supra note 263, at 910 n.91. The National Education Association, however, has been denied intervention on behalf of black teachers on at least two
occasions. See Bennett v. Madison County Bd. of Educ., 437 F.2d 554 (5th Cir. 1970);
Horton v. Lawrence County Bd. of Educ., 425 F.2d 735 (5th Cir. 1970).
305 However, courts have tended to deny intervention to groups opposing integration
more strenuously than defendants had opposed it. See United States v. Perry County
Bd. of Educ., 567 F.2d 277, 280 n.4 (5th Cir. 1978) ("That a plan differing from that
advanced by appellants was ultimately adopted does not mean that their interests were
not represented."); Cisneros v. Corpus Christi Indep. School Dist., 560 F.2d 190 (5th
Cir. 1977) (school district had offered rigorous legal and factual arguments in support of
the interests intervenors were asserting), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1075 (1978); Spangler v.
Pasadena City Bd. of Educ., 427 F.2d 1352, 1354 (9th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S.
943 (1971) (school board held hearings on proposed remedy and parents had opportunity to attend and influence Board's decision, but had no right to intervene); Hatton v.
County Bd. of Educ., 422 F.2d 457, 461 (6th Cir. 1970) (school board had asserted
"every reasonable defense" and white parents could not intervene to relitigate the desegregation cases). Cf. United States v. Board of School Comm'rs, 466 F.2d 573 (7th Cir.
1972) (affirmed denial of intervention of Citizens of Indianapolis for Quality Schools,
but suggested that in view of later broadening of issues the district court reconsider and
allow intervention), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 909 (1973).
306 For example, in Crawford v. Board of Educ., 17 Cal. 3d 280, 551 P.2d 28, 130
Cal. Rptr. 724 (1976), there were at least two citizen group intervenors: Bustop, which
objected to the fact that the school board allegedly exceeded its minimum constitutional
obligation, and BEST, a group which "frankly disavowed any knowledge of or position
toward any integration plan, but asserted that its members were well-intentioned citizens who would certainly have developed positions on the issues by the time they go to
court." Yeazell, supra note 133, at 248, 259. See also Johnson v. San Francisco Unified
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have used citizen monitoring commissions made up of representa30 7
tives of most groups affected by the remedy.
The case of Tasby v. Estes,3 °8 the Dallas school desegregation
case, is an example of the kind of participation that third parties
may have in the remedy stage of institutional reform litigation. The
original plaintiffs represented a class of black and Hispanic children. Parents and children with differing interests intervened.
They included the local branches of the National Association for
the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP), two groups of persons living in naturally integrated areas of Dallas, and residents of a
high-income, largely white area of Dallas.3" 9 The district court
took the basic form of the desegregation plan from a proposal by
the Dallas Alliance, a community group with strong ties to the
white business community.31 0 In addition, the court, in its first remedial order, appointed a Tri-Ethnic Committee to monitor the implementation of the decree.3 1' The defendant school district also
had several citizen-interest organizations designed to give various
3 12
groups information about, and input into, school district policy.
Third parties also achieve representation extrajudicially. Busing
opponents in Washington and California used initiatives or referenda to change state law to protect their perceived interests.3 13 By
School Dist., 500 F.2d 349 (9th Cir. 1974) (parents of Chinese speaking school children
intervened in school desegregation suit to argue that the proposed plan would make it
impossible for their children to attend community schools offering education in Chinese
language, art, culture, and history); Smuck v. Hobson, 408 F.2d 175 (D.C. Cir. 1969)
(en banc) (parents unhappy with remedy permitted to intervene to appeal certain portions of order when school board chose not to appeal); Moore v. Tangipahoa Parish
School Bd., 298 F. Supp. 288 (E.D. La. 1969) (parents and children denied intervention
of right but allowed permissive intervention). See generally Shapiro, Some Thoughts on
Intervention Before Courts, Agencies & Arbitrators, 81 HARV. L. REV. 721 (1968) (discussing generally the subject of intervention).
30 7
See, e.g., Morgan v. Kerrigan, 401 F. Supp. 216, 248-49 (D. Mass. 1975) (Citywide Coordinating Council), aff'd, 530 F.2d 401 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 935
(1976).
308 412 F. Supp. 1192 (N.D. Tex. 1976).
309
Id. at 1194.
310
Id. at 1202-07.
311 Tasby v. Estes, 342 F. Supp. 945, 953, (N.D. Tex. 1971). Although effective at
first, this committee came to have less importance in later years and was dissolved by
the district court in 1982. Tasby v. Wright, 559 F. Supp. 9 (N.D. Tex. 1982).
312 These groups include the Community Organization Joint Action Committee, The
Network, the PTA Presidents Council, and various ethnic advisory committees. See
letter to Hon. Barefoot Sanders from Robert F. Greenwald, Regional Mediator, Community Relations Service, U.S. Department of Justice, dated June 14, 1982 (copy on file
with author).
313 See Washington v. Seattle School Dist. No. 1, 458 U.S. 457 (1982) (Washington's
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successfully identifying their interests with neutral sounding government interests, the California group succeeded in limiting the
remedies available to successful plaintiffs.31 4
In short, concerns about the lack of third-party representation in
institutional reform cases are overstated, both procedurally and
substantively. In many cases, the interests of third parties are actually represented by one of the parties to the suit.31 5 Even when the
interests of persons affected by equitable remedies are not represented, their interests are protectCd by the Court's application of
traditional equitable balancing principles, sometimes in derogation
of the interests of successful plaintiffs.
CONCLUSION

Institutional reform cases differ in purpose and party structure
from traditional civil litigation. Institutional reform cases aim to
restructure certain units of society. In so doing, these cases affect
institutions and individuals that are not before the court. Courts,
commentators, and politicians have therefore expressed concern
that the rights of the absent parties and institutions not be ignored
in the remedy-creation process.
A survey of school desegregation and employment discrimination
cases shows that such fears are largely unfounded. Far from ignoring third-party interests, courts protect them, at least when such
interests are not de minimis. The courts do so in a number of ways.
First, the affected parties are often not absent. Many groups intervene at the remedy stage as parties or as litigating amici of sorts,
and thereby have an opportunity to protect their interests directly.
Other groups have a chance to voice their interests through the decision-making processes of the defendant institution.3 16
Initiative 350 held violative of the equal protection clause); Crawford v. Los Angeles
Bd. of Educ., 458 U.S. 527 (1982) (involving California's Proposition I).
3 14
See supra note 221 and accompanying text.
315 Indeed, in many cases, the defendant has identified itself with those interests all
along. Many school districts, for example, fought desegregation as long and hard as the
white parents. Many employers and unions resisted equal employment practices and
affirmative action as vigorously as the white employees objecting to the remedy.
316 Substantive law also protects third parties. In creating remedies, courts generally
have refused to deal with the interaction between the defendant's unlawful conduct and
other institutions in the community. For example, in school desegregation cases, courts
will not provide remedies for segregated housing patterns or poor economic conditions
in the black community unless proved to be a direct result of illegally segregated
schools. By tying the remedy to a narrow definition of violation, courts have lessened
the likelihood that third-party interests will be affected by institutional reform decrees.
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The Court also protects the interests of absent parties through
equitable interest balancing. Even when affected third parties are
absent, the Court's equitable process of balancing the rights of the
defendant and the public against the rights of the prevailing plaintiff
assures that the interests of third parties are considered. Although
these third-party interests do not always prevail, just as they would
not always prevail in the political process, they are considered and
weighed in creating equitable remedies.
Institutional reform cases raise very difficult issues of fairness and
test the application of theories to an imperfect world. Interest balancing may be the best vehicle that we currently have to deal with
the substantive and procedural difficulties inherent in lawsuits that
affect large numbers of people, some of whom are not parties to the
case. However, the rights of institutional reform plaintiffs are important ones. Such rights should not be balanced away by courts
with unfairly tipped scales.

